Chicago-Kent College of Law

Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

January 2009

Happiness and Punishment (with J. Bronsteen & J. Masur)
Christopher J. Buccafusco
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, cbuccafusco@kentlaw.iit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher J. Buccafusco, Happiness and Punishment (with J. Bronsteen & J. Masur), 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1037 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/149

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Chicago-Kent College of Law Intellectual Property, Science & Technology
Research Paper Series
Research Paper No. 10-024

January 2010

Happiness and Punishment
John Bronsteen

Christopher Buccafusco

Loyola University Chicago School
of Law

Chicago-Kent College of Law

Jonathan S. Masur
The University of Chicago Law
School

Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009).
Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Happiness and Punishment (U. Chi.
L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 424, 2009).
Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Happiness and Punishment, (U. Chi.
Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 230, 2009).
Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Happiness and Punishment, (U. Ill.
L. & Econ., Research Paper No. LE08-029, 2009).

© 2009 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research
Network at http://www.ssrn.com/link/Chicago-Kent-Law-STI.html

www.kentlaw.edu

Happiness and Punishment
John Bronsteen,† Christopher Buccafusco,†† & Jonathan Masur‡
This Article continues our project of applying new findings in the behavioral psychology of human happiness to some of the most deeply analyzed questions in law.
When a state decides how to punish criminal offenders, at least one important consideration is the amount of harm any given punishment is likely to inflict. It would be undesirable, for example, to impose greater harm on those who commit less serious crimes or
to impose harm that rises to the level of cruelty. Our penal system fits punishments to
crimes primarily by adjusting the size of monetary fines and the length of prison terms,
but new findings about human adaptability unsettle the assumptions upon which the
system rests. Specifically, people adapt well to negative changes in wealth and even to
many features of prison life, whereas they adapt poorly to typical conditions of postprison life such as unemployment, disease, and loss of social ties. As a result, adjusting
the size of a fine or the length of a prison term will not change in a linear fashion the
amount of harm imposed. A large difference in the size of two punishments will not
necessarily result in a large (or, in the case of some fines, any) difference in the harm felt
by the respective offenders. This result is relevant to both retributive and utilitarian punishment theories, as well as to the practice of criminal justice. New approaches to punishment
are necessary to achieve proportionality in light of the challenges posed by adaptation.

INTRODUCTION
Now as for the future of reflection about punishment: First, I think
we can look forward to continued valuable illumination from the
social-science disciplines.
1

—Herbert Morris

When the state punishes a criminal, it inflicts suffering. There are
limits on the amount and type of suffering that may legitimately be imposed, so it is necessary to understand how punishment actually harms
those who receive it. To what extent do fines and incarceration negatively affect happiness or well-being? The answers might seem ob† Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
†† Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
‡ Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School.
We thank Stephanos Bibas, Frederic Bloom, Josh Bowers, Sharon Dolovitch, Brandon Garrett,
Bernard Harcourt, Dan Kahan, Adam Kolber, Brian Leiter, Richard McAdams, Eric Posner,
Adam Samaha, Stephanie Stern, Lior Strahilevitz, David Strauss, and Jeannie Suk for helpful
comments, and Kathleen Rubenstein for excellent research assistance.
1
Herbert Morris, Concluding Remarks: The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L Rev 1927,
1930 (1999).
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vious, but as we have indicated in the context of civil settlements, recent empirical work in behavioral psychology suggests otherwise.
This empirical work suggests that people adapt to monetary fines
far better than they expect. Losing money tends to decrease one’s level
of happiness initially, but that level rebounds quickly toward its initial
state. Even large fines are likely to have only minor effects on the wellbeing of those who receive them, because people adjust quite easily to
their new financial circumstances. Adaptation thus heavily reduces the
punitive consequence of a fine.
Prison has a more complicated effect on happiness. To a noteworthy degree, people adapt to being in prison. Their happiness drops at the
beginning and they expect it to remain at that low ebb, but it ascends as
they adjust to their new surroundings. On the other hand, virtually any
period of incarceration, no matter how brief, has consequences that
negatively affect prisoners’ lives in ways that resist adaptation, even
after they have been released. Prisoners are often abandoned by their
spouses and friends, face difficulty finding and keeping employment,
and may suffer from incurable diseases contracted during their incarceration. Thus, living in prison itself becomes less oppressive with time,
but the effects of having been in prison tend to linger and to diminish
happiness indefinitely.
These results differ from the assumptions that generally underlie
penal policy and philosophical scholarship on punishment. All major
accounts of punishment place a high value on proportionality: more
serious crimes warrant more severe punishment, either to effect greater
deterrence, to repay the offender adequately for her misdeeds, to express the appropriate level of societal condemnation, or some combi3
nation thereof. But owing to the ways in which people do and do not
adapt to various hardships, our current methods of punishment may
be too blunt to fashion proportional punishments.
Adjusting the size of a fine or the length of a prison sentence does
not adjust, to the degree expected or in a linear fashion, the amount of
unhappiness that is ultimately experienced by the offender. Offenders
adapt to paying more money or to staying in prison for a longer period.
As a result, fines of varying sizes may well impose only fleeting harm.
On the other hand, virtually any term of imprisonment imposes large

2
See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Hedonic Adaptation
and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 Colum L Rev 1516, 1536–38 (2008) (arguing that hedonic adaptation increases the probability of pretrial settlement by lowering a tort plaintiff’s acceptable settlement price).
3
We employ the feminine pronoun here because it is our preferred convention, despite
the fact that the vast majority of prisoners are male and the behavioral studies we discuss employed only male subjects.
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and lasting harm by causing disease, unemployment, and loss of social
connection. But the difference in harm between longer and shorter
prison terms is smaller than typically assumed, with heavier harm occurring at the beginning of imprisonment and persistent harm plaguing
post-prison life. These facts make it more difficult to tailor a punishment to fit the severity of a crime, given the penal options available.
In addition to undermining efforts to tailor proportional punishments, adaptation has other significant effects. It diminishes the harm
imposed by a monetary fine without diminishing the fine’s capacity to
deter, because would-be offenders will mistakenly expect a large fine
to decrease their happiness substantially. Adaptation to the actual
time spent in prison works similarly, but that phenomenon works at
cross-purposes with the fact that post-prison life is worse than has
been assumed by most theorists, legislators, and presumably offenders.
In designing a system of punishment, scholars and policymakers need
to account for the ramifications of hedonic adaptation to the extent
that penal regimes should reflect the actual experience of punishment.
This holds for both retributive and utilitarian theorists.
Our aim in this Article is to use recent psychological findings to
describe more accurately the effects of punishment. In Part I, we analyze the findings and the studies that give rise to them. In Part II, we
apply the findings to the utilitarian theory of punishment, and in
Part III we apply them to retributive and mixed theories of punishment. We assess the import of the findings for each theory and the
new challenges they pose for criminal justice.
I. THE HEDONIC CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT
All leading theories of criminal punishment must be concerned with
4
the way punishment is subjectively experienced by the offender. Until
recently, however, little was known about how people responded to the
various punishments inflicted on them. Over the past couple of decades,
and especially in the last few years, an interdisciplinary group of social
scientists has begun to develop techniques for measuring the subjective
pain—physical and psychological—that punishment inflicts.
This research on the subjective experience of punishment is part of
a larger body of social science research devoted to the measurement
5
and determinants of subjective well-being. Motivated by the belief that

4

See Adam Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 Colum L Rev 182, 196 (2009).
See Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, Preface, in Daniel Kahneman,
Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, Well-being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology ix
(Russell Sage 1999) (presenting a new field within psychology, “the study of what makes experiences and life pleasant or unpleasant,” which the authors christen “hedonic psychology”).
5
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individual self-reports provide the best metrics of well-being, hedonic
psychology (or simply “hedonics”) has emerged as one of the most
6
vibrant fields in the behavioral sciences. Among its most robust and
consistent findings are two that are highly relevant to the study of punishment: (1) many life events, whether positive or negative, exert little lasting effect on an individual’s well-being because people adapt
rapidly to them; and (2) people do not recognize or remember how
quickly they adapt and thus make very poor estimates about the he7
donic impact of future events. Studies have shown that a person’s
well-being initially decreases but soon rebounds (at least to some
meaningful degree) following negative experiences of all magnitudes,
8
ranging from learning that she scored poorly on a personality test to
9
becoming paraplegic.
This Part explores evidence of hedonic adaptation to the two
principal forms of punishment used in the United States, monetary
10
fines and imprisonment. Recent social scientific studies support the
notion that criminals adapt to these punishments, and that increasing
their magnitude through larger fines or longer prison terms will have less
than the expected effect on the punishments’ overall hedonic impact. Yet
while offenders are likely to adapt to paying fines and spending time in
prison, other research has shown that incarceration substantially affects
former inmates for many years following prison. People who have spent
any time in prison are significantly more likely to experience chronic,
stress-related health impairments, unemployment, and the breakdown
of psychologically vital social ties. These post-prison consequences of

6
For a review of the extensive literature on happiness and hedonics, see Sonja Lyubomirsky, Kennon M. Sheldon, and David Schkade, Pursuing Happiness: The Architecture of Sustainable Change, 9 Rev Gen Psych 111, 112 (2005). Hedonic psychology has also had a substantial impact on American popular culture. See generally, for example, Malcolm Gladwell, Blink:
The Power of Thinking without Thinking (Little, Brown 2005); Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on
Happiness (Knopf 2006); Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in
Ancient Wisdom (Basic Books 2006).
7
Timothy D. Wilson, et al, Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting,
78 J Personality & Soc Psych 821, 833 (2000).
8
See Daniel T. Gilbert, et al, Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J Personality & Soc Psych 617, 629 (1998).
9
See C. Lundqvist, et al, Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional Status, 16
Spine 78, 81 (1991) (finding that patients with traumatic spinal cord injuries showed improvement
in mood that was “obvious after 2 years and continuously better later”).
10 Although we focus on fines and imprisonment, our arguments are certainly relevant to
debates about less traditional forms of punishment, including shaming. See, for example, Dan M.
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U Chi L Rev 591, 594 (1996). For brevity’s sake,
we also do not discuss certain punishments that are traditionally viewed as less severe than fines,
such as probation and community service. For a discussion of these punishments, see Norval
Morris and Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System 6–7 (Oxford 1990).
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incarceration are likely to generate substantial and long-lasting hedonic
penalties for ex-inmates regardless of the lengths of their sentences.
One cautionary note is in order. The field of hedonic psychology
is still quite young, and many questions remain unanswered. Throughout this Article we endeavor wherever possible to use only the most
reliable existing research, and we are at pains to avoid drawing conclusions beyond what the psychological findings can sustain. The arguments we advance here are, of course, subject to revision as new
research comes to light.
A. Hedonic Adaptation and Affective Forecasting
In a now-classic study published in 1978, Philip Brickman and his
colleagues compared recent lottery winners and recently paralyzed
paraplegics and quadriplegics with control groups. The lottery winners
were not much happier than the controls, and the accident victims
were considerably happier than anticipated, reporting levels of well11
being above the scale’s midpoint. According to Brickman, these results indicated that people experience life as if on a “hedonic treadmill” such that positive and negative life events create only temporary
12
departures from an established well-being set point. This theory has
been enormously influential in the social sciences, particularly as it has
13
challenged the traditional economic understanding of utility. Moreover, it has motivated innumerable studies exploring the hedonic con14
sequences of a large variety of events.
15
These studies, whether examining responses to income gains, te16
17
nure denial, or disability, often report similar findings: “Most people
11 Philip Brickman, Dan Coates, and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and Accident
Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J Personality & Soc Psych 917, 920–21 (1978).
12 Philip Brickman and Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good
Society, in M.H. Appley, ed, Adaptation-level Theory: A Symposium 287, 289 (Academic 1971).
13 See Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, eds,
Well-being 15–22 (cited in note 5) (challenging the traditional economic understanding that
changes in wealth represent permanent changes in utility because an accurate estimation of
utility requires a study of utility’s duration); Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100
Proceedings Natl Academy Sci 11176, 11176 (2003) (questioning, based upon empirical observations from happiness surveys, the common economic assumption that overall well-being moves
in tandem with changes in income).
14 For an early review, see Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation,
in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, eds, Well-being at 302, 312 (cited in note 5).
15 See Easterlin, 100 Proceedings Natl Acad Sci at 11176, 11182 (cited in note 13) (“An
increase in income . . . does not bring with it a lasting increase in happiness because of the negative effect on utility of hedonic adaptation and social comparison.”).
16 See Gilbert, et al, 75 J Personality & Soc Psych at 624 (cited in note 8) (reporting results
suggesting that “the outcome of a tenure decision did not have a dramatic and robust influence
on the general happiness of experiencers,” despite the subjects’ predictions that, at least in the
short term, it would).
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are reasonably happy most of the time, and most events do little to
18
change that for long.” The many studies examining people’s expe19
riences with disability provide the most compelling evidence. For example, people with spinal cord injuries report levels of well-being simi20
21
lar to those of healthy controls, as do burn victims, patients with co22
lostomies, and those undergoing dialysis for treatment of kidney dis23
orders. In the most recent longitudinal study of adaptation, economists
tracked the subjective well-being ratings of people who subsequently
became disabled and remained so. They found that after two years,
subjects had become significantly happier than they were immediately
24
after they became injured. Although the psychological mechanisms
underlying hedonic adaptation remain poorly understood, it seems as
though people have a “psychological immune system” that helps them
25
cope with the effects of many kinds of adverse events.

17 See Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J Pub Econ 1061, 1070
(2008) (finding that individuals who become disabled can experience some hedonic adaptation,
though it is incomplete for those with severe disability).
18 Gilbert, et al, 75 J Personality & Soc Psych at 618 (cited in note 8).
19 For a review of these studies and their implications for legal settlement, see Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur, 108 Colum L Rev at 1527–31, 1541 (cited in note 2).
20 See Lundqvist, et al, 16 Spine at 80 (cited in note 9).
21 See David R. Patterson, et al, Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113 Psych
Bull 362, 370, 375 (1993).
22 See Norman F. Boyd, et al, Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 Med Dec Making
58, 65–66 (1990) (finding that patients who had colostomies reported higher utility scores for life
with a colostomy than either rectal cancer patients without colostomies or healthy volunteers
who were asked to imagine life with a colostomy).
23 See Jason Riis, et al, Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using
Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J Exp Psych: General 3, 6 (2005).
24 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1066, 1070 (cited in note 17). As a group,
people who became disabled reported an average well-being score of 4.8 out of 7 for the two
years preceding disability, an abrupt fall to 3.7 at the onset of disability, and then a subsequent
rebound to 4.1 in the next two years despite the fact that the disabilities themselves had not
changed. Separating the moderately and severely disabled groups, the authors found approximately 50 percent adaptation to moderate disability and 30 percent adaptation to severe disability. Thus, there is substantial evidence that hedonic adaptation to disability (even if incomplete)
is significant. See id.
25 Gilbert, et al, 75 J Personality & Soc Psych at 619 (cited in note 8) (“Ego defense, rationalization, dissonance reduction, motivated reasoning, positive illusions, self-serving attribution,
self-deception, self-enhancement, self-affirmation, and self-justification are just some of the
terms that psychologists have used to describe the various strategies, mechanisms, tactics, and
maneuvers of the psychological immune system.”). Similarly, Daniel Kahneman and Richard
Thaler note that a subject’s attention is normally directed toward novelty, including changes in
response to disability. Therefore, “as the new state loses its novelty it ceases to be the exclusive
focus of attention, and other aspects of life again evoke their varying hedonic responses.” Daniel
Kahneman and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility, 20 J
Econ Perspectives 221, 230 (2006). These coping strategies are evolutionarily adaptive, allowing
people to recover quickly from considerable misfortune. See id.
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These studies rely entirely upon self-reporting, which is never
perfectly reliable. It is possible that subjects are misdescribing their
own well-being in one fashion or another. However, it is worth noting
that self-reports of well-being are highly correlated with external
26
27
measures such as third-party informant reports, facial expressions,
28
and neurological data. The studies on adaptation to prison that we
describe below similarly involve both self-reports and objective measures of well-being, which correlate with one another in that context as
29
well.
Although adaptation is common, further research has demonstrated
30
its limits. People seem less likely to adapt to some health-related stimuli
31
32
like noise, chronic headaches, and certain degenerative diseases such as
33
34
35
rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, HIV/AIDS, and hepatitis C
36
37
infections. Additionally, socially relevant stimuli such as divorce, the

26 See Heidi Lepper, Use of Other-reports to Validate Subjective Well-being Measures, 44
Soc Indicators Res 367, 377 (1998); Ed Sandvik, Ed Diener, and Larry Seidlitz, Subjective Wellbeing: The Convergence and Stability of Self-report and Non-self-report Measures, 61 J Personality 317, 337 (1993).
27 Tiffany A. Ito and John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals, in
Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, eds, Well-being at 479–80 (cited in note 5).
28 Id at 476 (presenting research demonstrating that self-reported reactions to stimuli
correlate with anterior cortical activity). See generally T.G. Dinan, Glucocorticoids and the Genesis of Depressive Illness: A Psychobiological Model, 164 Brit J Psychiatry 365 (1994).
29 In addition, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions regarding the size of any reported gain
in subjective well-being. If respondents’ self-assessments are not perfectly linear, a person who
reports her level of well-being as a “4” on a scale of 0 to 7 may not be twice as well off as a person
who reports her well-being as a “2.” Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and
Cost-benefit Analysis, 37 J Leg Stud 253, 280–81 (2008). Still, these gains are not random (or zero);
these interpretive difficulties do not obscure the fact that some degree of meaningful adaptation is
almost certainly taking place. Indeed, the reported gains to well-being could just as easily be larger
than a linear approach would indicate, rather than smaller. Truly idiosyncratic reporting should also
wash out across large sample populations. See Rafael di Tella and Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses
of Happiness Data in Economics, 20 J Econ Persp 25, 29 (2006).
30 See Frederick and Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation at 319 (cited in note 14) (concluding,
after reviewing the literature on hedonic adaptation, that in certain environments adaptation is
not the norm).
31 See Neil D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence against Adaptation, 2 J
Envir Psych 87, 94 (1992).
32 See Victoria Guitera, et al, Quality of Life in Chronic Daily Headache: A Study in a
General Population, 58 Neurology 1062, 1064 (2002).
33 See Craig A. Smith and Kenneth A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patients with Chronic
Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a General Model, 11 Health Psych 151, 158–59 (1992).
34 See Richard F. Antonak and Hanoch Livneh, Psychosocial Adaptation to Disability and
Its Investigation among Persons with Multiple Sclerosis, 40 Soc Sci & Med 1099, 1103 (1995).
35 See Ron D. Hays, et al, Health-related Quality of Life in Patients with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: Results from the HIV Cost and Services Utilization
Study, 108 Am J Med 714, 718 (2000).
36 See Judith I. Tsui, et al, The Impact of Chronic Hepatitis C on Health-related Quality of Life
in Homeless and Marginally Housed Individuals with HIV, 11 AIDS & Behav 603, 609 (2007).
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39

death of a spouse, and unemployment prove difficult to adapt to,
with hedonic penalties lasting for a considerable time into the future.
In addition, although adaptation’s effects appear substantial, they
are hardly ever recognized or remembered. Research on affective forecasting—the ability to predict how future events will make you feel—
has repeatedly shown that people suffer from both impact and duration
biases, causing them to overestimate the size and the length of future
40
hedonic experiences. For example, people generally predict that becoming disabled will have an enormous and long-lasting impact on
their happiness, despite the fact that most people adapt rapidly to dis41
ability. According to Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, people suffer from focusing illusions caused by paying too much attention to the
few changes wrought by new events while ignoring the many things
42
that remain the same.
These findings apply not just to rare occurrences such as becoming disabled but also to more regularly recurring events like being
dumped by a girlfriend, seeing a favorite football team lose, and being
43
passed over for a job. Psychologists have hypothesized that learning
from past hedonic experiences is rare because the process of doing so
44
is complex. It requires people to recognize that they have experienced similar events in the past, make an effort to remember how
45
those events made them feel, and accurately recall their reactions.

37 See Richard E. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 Psych Sci 945, 948 (2005).
38 See Richard E. Lucas, et al, Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J Personality & Soc Psych 527, 535 (2003) (“[N]ot
everyone experiences adaptation; many respondents report stable or even decreasing levels of
satisfaction for many years following the loss of a spouse.”).
39 See Richard E. Lucas, et al, Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15
Psych Sci 8, 11 (2004) (“People were less satisfied in the years following unemployment, and this
decline occurred even though individuals eventually regained employment.”).
40 See Timothy D. Wilson and Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to
Want, 14 Current Directions Psych Sci 131, 131–32 (2005) (identifying focalism, “the tendency to
overestimate how much we will think about the event in the future,” as one cause for the error).
41 See Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein, and Christopher Jepson, Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J Exp Psych: Applied 111, 111 (2005).
42 See Daniel T. Gilbert and Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, Science
1351, 1352 (Sept 7, 2007); Wilson, et al, 78 J Personality & Soc Psych at 822 (cited in note 7) (“Research on subjective well-being suggests that people’s attention turns quickly to their current
concerns, reducing the impact of past events on their happiness.”).
43 See Peter Ayton, Alice Pott, and Najat Elwakili, Affective Forecasting: Why Can’t People
Predict Their Emotions?, 13 Thinking & Reasoning 62, 64–66 (2007).
44 See generally id.
45 Deborah A. Kermer, et al, Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17 Psych Sci
649, 652 (2006).
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46

The last of these is a particularly steep burden. Thus, even people with
substantial previous experience with a stimulus are unlikely to remember that its hedonic impact was both weaker and shorter than predicted.
B.

Adaptation to Economic Loss

Perhaps hedonic psychology’s only finding more important—and
more counterintuitive—than adaptation to disability is its consistent
evidence of the limited hedonic impact of changes in income. Since
the economist Richard Easterlin first proposed his “paradox” about
47
the lack of correlation between income and happiness, numerous
studies have supported the idea that, except below the level of subsistence, increased income produces very limited gains in subjective well48
being. A variety of explanations for this phenomenon have emerged,
49
ranging from constantly rising aspiration levels to altered social com50
parisons, but the message is clear: money can’t buy happiness.
But can losing money make you less happy? There is less research on the hedonic impact of economic losses, but what does exist
51
suggests that people adapt to losses much as they do gains. Ed Diener
46 See Daniel T. Gilbert, Jay Meyers, and Timothy D. Wilson, Lessons from the Past: Do
People Learn from Experience That Emotional Reactions Are Short-lived?, 27 Personality & Soc
Psych Bull 1648, 1649 (2001), citing Sven-Åke Christianson and Martin A. Safer, Emotional Events
in Autobiographical Memory, in David C. Rubin, ed, Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory 235 (Cambridge 1996) (“There are apparently no published studies in which a
group of subjects has accurately recalled the intensity and/or frequency of their previously recorded emotions.”).
47 See Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence, in Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder, eds, Nations and Households in Economic
Growth 89, 118 (Academic 1974) (studying nineteen countries and concluding that while there is
a correlation between citizens’ income and happiness within a single country, no such correlation
exists when the national happiness levels of rich and poor countries are compared). The Easterlin paradox has since been called into serious question, but evidence that income has only a very
small effect on happiness now appears more robust than ever. See Betsey Stevenson and Justin
Wolfers, Economic Growth and Subjective Well-being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox, 1
Brookings Papers on Econ Activity 1 (2008) (finding a link between the average subjective wellbeing and per capita GDP across countries).
48 For a review of the extensive literature, see generally Ed Diener and Robert BiswasDiener, Will Money Increase Subjective Well-being? A Literature Review and Guide to Needed
Research, 57 Soc Indicators Rsrch 119 (2002).
49 See Easterlin, 100 Proceedings Natl Acad Sci at 11180 (cited in note 13) (explaining that
“material aspirations increase commensurately with income”).
50 See Diener and Biswas-Diener, 57 Soc Indicators Rsrch at 147 (cited in note 48)
(“[S]ocial comparison . . . had a direct effect on satisfaction”).
51 It is worth pointing out that hedonic adaptation to losses may not be identical to adaptation to gains. Research from the field of behavioral decision theory has repeatedly shown that
losses loom larger psychologically than do gains. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 279 (1979) (indicating that the value function is “steeper for losses than for gains”). Indeed, losses trigger stronger
neural activity than do gains. See generally Roy F. Baumeister, et al, Bad Is Stronger Than Good,
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and his colleagues tracked people who lost at least half a standard deviation of their annual income in a longitudinal study over a period of
52
nine years. Not only were these people not unhappier than those whose
incomes increased or remained the same, they were actually happier
53
(although not statistically significantly so). In another study, subjects
who lost a $3 gamble had returned very close to pregamble happiness
54
levels in only ten minutes. Although these amounts and time periods
55
are very small, the authors extrapolate to more substantial sums.
As we will explore later, studies such as these may have implications for the imposition of monetary penalties on criminal offenders.
This is not to say that all losses of money are equivalent; criminals
may react differently to fines than workers do to reductions in income.
But near-complete adaptation in the latter context likely implies at
least meaningful adaptation in the former. Although criminal fines will
likely cause immediate decreases in offenders’ well-being, their effects
will probably be smaller and of shorter duration than predicted. And
just as adding $20,000 to a $100,000 annual salary produces surprisingly little happiness, losing $20,000 probably causes a much smaller longterm loss of well-being than one might imagine.
C.

Adaptation to Imprisonment

Monetary fines are regularly used as punishment in the United
States, but imprisonment serves as the “linchpin” of the nation’s re56
sponse to crime, and understanding its effects on offenders is essential. Social scientific interest in prisoners’ responses to incarceration
began in the 1950s following Donald Clemmer’s theory of “prisonization,” predicting the steady deterioration in prisoners’ physical and
57
psychological health over the course of a sentence. More recently,
5 Rev Gen Psych 323 (2001) (“Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback have more impact
than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly than good.”); John T. Cacioppo and Gary G. Berntson, Relationship between Attitudes and Evaluative Space: A Critical Review, with Emphasis on the Separability of Positive and Negative Substrates, 115 Psych Bull 401
(1994) (proposing that the evaluative processes by which humans discriminate positive from
negative environments are not activated reciprocally).
52 Ed Diener, et al, The Relationship between Income and Subjective Well-being: Relative or
Absolute?, 28 Soc Indicators Rsrch 195, 221 (1993).
53 Id at 209.
54 See Kermer, et al, 17 Psych Sci at 651 (cited in note 45) (reporting that participants’ expectations that losing $3 would have a greater impact than gaining $5 were found to be wrong).
55 See id at 652.
56 Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher, and Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion about
Punishment and Corrections, 27 Crime & Just 1, 2, 8–9 (2000) (explaining the increasing popularity of prisons as a reflection of public sentiment that is at once punitive and progressive).
57 See Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community 299–300 (Christopher 1940) (introducing
prisonization as the adoption of the “folkways, mores, customs, and general culture of the penitentiary” that “breed or deepen criminality and antisociality”).
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however, these findings have been challenged by evidence that pris58
oners rapidly adapt to incarceration. Consistent with evidence of
adaptation in other domains, incarceration appears to result in substantial psychological distress upon imprisonment followed by gains in
59
well-being as the prison term progresses.
An early cross-sectional study compared inmates who had served
one year of a long-term sentence with those who had served about a
60
decade of such a sentence. The recently incarcerated offenders exhibited significantly higher levels of self-reported anxiety, depression,
61
and psychosomatic illnesses than the longer-serving inmates. According to the authors,
These results suggest that the early period of incarceration is particularly stressful for long-term offenders as they make the transition from the outside world to institutional life. No evidence
supports the notion of psychological deterioration over time. Instead, with more time served, long termers appear to develop
62
strategies for coping with prison.

58 See Frederick and Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation at 311 (cited in note 14) (“Although incarceration is designed to be unpleasant, most of the research on adjustment to prison
life points to considerable adaptation following a difficult initial adjustment period.”). For an
early review of the literature, see Lee H. Bukstel and Peter R. Kilmann, Psychological Effects of
Imprisonment on Confined Individuals, 88 Psych Bull 469, 487 (1980) (finding no support for
“the popular notion that correctional confinement is harmful to most individuals”).
59 See Edward Zamble, Behavior and Adaptation in Long-term Prison Inmates: Descriptive
Longitudinal Results, 19 Crim Just & Behav 409, 420–21 (1992) (finding evidence of prisoners’
improved adaptation including considerable decreases over time of stress, stress-related medical
problems, and the number of disciplinary incidents); Edward Zamble and Frank Porporino, Coping,
Imprisonment, and Rehabilitation: Some Data and Their Implications, 17 Crim Just & Behav 53,
67 (1990) (finding that treatment programs to help prisoners cope would be most effective at the
very beginning or the very end of the prison term); Edward Zamble and Frank J. Porporino,
Coping, Behavior, and Adaptation in Prison Inmates 116–20 (Springer-Verlag 1988) (conducting a
longitudinal study of prisoner adaptation and concluding that prisoners’ initial emotional trauma
subsided through the year-long study term); Doris Layton MacKenzie and Lynne Goodstein,
Long-term Incarceration Impacts and Characteristics of Long-term Offenders: An Empirical
Analysis, 12 Crim Just & Behav 395, 409 (1985) (presenting evidence that inmates in the first
three years of long prison terms experienced more stress than those who had served at least six
years in prison); Timothy J. Flanagan, The Pains of Long-term Imprisonment: A Comparison of
British and American Perspectives, 20 Brit J Criminol 148, 155 (1980) (finding that over time,
most inmates “do not report that imprisonment has seriously threatened their well-being”).
Consider also Mandeep K. Dhami, Peter Ayton, and George Loewenstein, Adaptation to Imprisonment: Indigenous or Imported?, 34 Crim Just & Behav 1085, 1096 (2007) (finding that prisoners participated in more programs as they spent more time in prison).
60 See MacKenzie and Goodstein, 12 Crim Just & Behav at 405 (cited in note 59) (“On
average, [the early long-term offenders] had served 1.3 years in prison and were serving sentences requiring 12.1 years in prison. The [late long-term offenders] had served an average of
10.3 years in prison and were serving sentences with an average length of 15.7 years.”).
61 Id at 406–07.
62 Id at 409.
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Cross-sectional studies can suffer from intergroup comparison problems, but the evidence for adaptation to prison has been bolstered by
63
longitudinal studies tracking inmates across prison terms. One such
study surveyed a group of prisoners regularly over seven years. As in
the cross-sectional studies, the researchers found that prisoners interviewed in their first month of incarceration showed alarmingly high
64
levels of negative affect associated with depression and anxiety. Within
a few months, however, the prisoners’ self-reported mental health had
improved substantially, with reports of depression and anxiety falling by
65
nearly one-third. A year later, reports of negative affect fell further but
66
were still higher than in a random sample of released inmates. Interviews conducted six years later revealed additional decreases in negative affect and improvements of positive affect such that, on at least one
67
scale, prisoners’ reports fell within the normal range.
From these studies a pattern of hedonic response to imprisonment emerges. Initial entry into the prison environment triggers significant psychological distress and low levels of well-being. Within weeks,
however, inmates develop coping mechanisms that enable them to
68
adjust to their situations and improve their well-being. After this initial period of substantial adjustment, an offender’s well-being appears

63 See, for example, Zamble, 19 Crim Just & Behav at 420–21 (cited in note 59); Zamble
and Porporino, Coping, Behavior, and Adaptation in Prison Inmates at 19, 116–20 (cited in note 59).
See also Dhami, Ayton, and Loewenstein, 34 Crim Just & Behav at 1097 (cited in note 59)
(“Ideally, adaptations should be studied longitudinally, but this can be difficult in practice.”).
64 See Zamble and Porporino, 17 Crim Just & Behav at 64 (cited in note 59) (finding, for
example, that a majority of subjects reported suffering from some form of depression or anxiety).
65 See id (finding that although a majority of subjects exhibited emotional distress at the
beginning of the prison term, the number of prisoners who were depressed or highly anxious fell
by nearly one-third just three months later); Zamble and Porporino, Coping, Behavior, and
Adaptation in Prison Inmates at 109 (cited in note 59).
66 See Zamble and Porporino, 17 Crim Just & Behav at 64 (cited in note 59).
67 We believe that subjective reports of positive and negative affect provide the best available proxy for measuring well-being. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and
Jonathan Masur, Welfare as Happiness (University of Chicago Olin Working Paper No 468, May
2009), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397843 (visited Sept 1, 2009). Nonetheless, broader
measures of an inmate’s quality of life can be useful, and here we are in accord with the psychological findings on affect. In the longitudinal extension of Zamble and Porporino’s earlier study,
inmates’ reports of their quality of life rose from 32.2 to 42.0 on a 100-point scale. Although these
findings are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level, they offer some additional evidence
of adaptation to imprisonment. See id. In addition, it is worth mentioning that some of these cognitive improvements may have been related to equivalent improvements in the inmates’ objective
conditions. See id.
68 As early as the sixteenth century, Thomas More recognized prison’s limited impact on
his own well-being, writing from his cell to his wife: “[I]s not this house as nigh heaven as mine
own?” Anthony Kenny and Charles Kenny, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Utility: Happiness in
Philosophical and Economic Thought 59–60 (Imprint Academic 2006) (quoting a letter from
Thomas More to his wife).
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to improve more moderately throughout the remainder of her term.
70
Thus, the “pains of imprisonment” are felt immediately, with diminishing hedonic penalties over the remainder of the sentence.
D. The Long-term Effects of Prison on Well-being
Whereas being in prison may be less uniformly harmful than expected because some of its features lend themselves to adaptation, having
been in prison for any length of time may be more harmful than expected
because some highly negative features of post-prison life resist adaptation. Researchers have discovered that any amount of incarceration
creates a significantly higher likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer a variety of health-related, economic, and social harms with substantial negative hedonic consequences that will make adaptation extremely difficult.
Until very recently, it was widely believed that incarceration produced no direct, causal effects on ex-inmates’ health, employment, and
71
family lives. Any correlation between imprisonment and poor health
or job prospects was thought to be the result of selection effects; that
is, the people who ended up in prison disproportionately came from
groups with poor health and limited employment opportunities to
72
begin with. In the past few years, however, researchers hit on the idea
of applying the same longitudinal surveys used to study well-being to
track offenders in the years before and after imprisonment and thus
73
isolate the effects of imprisonment itself.

69 There is, however, some evidence that the final few weeks of the sentence prove stressful
and thus decrease well-being. See Bukstel and Kilmann, 88 Psych Bull at 488 (cited in note 58)
(“The typical pattern among these individuals might involve an initial adjustment reaction to
incarceration, followed by a period of successful adjustment with another mild psychological
reaction (e.g., ‘short-timer’s syndrome’) occurring just prior to release.”).
70 See Gresham M. Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison
63–83 (Princeton 1958) (examining the prison system from the prisoner’s perspective with respect to loss of liberty, goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and security).
71 See Jason Schnittker and Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-term Effects of
Incarceration on Health, 48 J Health & Soc Behav 115, 117 (2007).
72 Id.
73 See generally Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42
L & Socy Rev 275 (2008); Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious
Disease, and Other Stress-related Illnesses, 49 J Health & Soc Behav 56 (2008); Schnittker and
John, 48 J Health & Soc Behav at 117 (cited in note 71); Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (Russell Sage 2006) (tracking employment prospects and wage growth of exinmates); Leonard M. Lopoo and Bruce Western, Incarceration and the Formation and Stability
of Marital Unions, 67 J Marriage & Fam 721 (2005) (finding that “the prevalence of marriage
would change little if incarceration dates were reduced”). In the descriptions of these studies, it
should be assumed unless otherwise stated that the results control for a variety of variables
including age, gender, education level, health, and so forth. For specific control variables, please
consult the individual studies.
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Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Michael Massoglia has found that an ex-inmate has a much higher likelihood than the average person of reporting health problems associated
74
with stress and communicable diseases. Former inmates are more than
twice as likely to report hepatitis C infections, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
75
and urinary tract infections. Moreover, they report substantially higher levels of chronic headaches, sleeping problems, dizziness, and heart
76
77
problems. Considering the high incidence of prison sexual violence
78
and the many stressors associated with post-prison life, these results
should not be surprising. What is surprising, however, is evidence from
Massoglia and others that the incidence and severity of these health
79
problems are almost entirely unrelated to sentence length. Incarceration for any length of time greater than twelve months exposes offenders to the full complement of negative postincarceration health
outcomes. After twelve months, the marginal health effect of addition80
al time in prison is negligible.
Studies examining ex-inmates’ employment prospects report simi81
lar findings. Felony imprisonment results in social stigma, the erosion
74

Massoglia, 49 J Health & Soc Behav at 57 (cited in note 73).
Massoglia, 42 L & Socy Rev at 296 (cited in note 73) (positing that increased exposure
to infectious disease while in prison and lower social status after release as explanations for the
health-incarceration relationship).
76 Massoglia, 49 J Health & Soc Behav at 57 (cited in note 73). It is worth noting, however,
that imprisonment does not result in higher incidences of all health problems. See id.
77 See Tonisha R. Jones and Travis C. Pratt, The Prevalence of Sexual Violence in Prison:
The State of the Knowledge Base and Implications for Evidence-based Correctional Policy Making, 52 Intl J Offender Therapy & Comp Criminol 280, 289 (2008) (“[T]he research indicates that
such studies typically report prison sexual victimization rates of around 20%, suggesting that
prison sexual victimization is a significant problem to be addressed.”).
78 Massoglia, 49 J Health & Soc Behav at 57 (cited in note 73) (“[T]he experience of incarceration likely acts as a primary stressor, while characteristics of life after release—stigma, decreased
earnings and employment prospects, and family problems—are a series of secondary stressors.”).
79 Id at 61 (“[E]xposure to incarceration, rather than length of incarceration, appears to be
more important to the relationship between incarceration and health problems.”). See also
Schnittker and John, 48 J Health & Soc Behav at 125 (cited in note 71).
80 See Massoglia, 49 J Health & Soc Behav at 60–61 (cited in note 73). The studies we rely
upon for this proposition all concerned medium- and maximum-security prisons where no prisoner
was incarcerated for less than twelve months. It thus may be that a shorter term in jail or a minimum-security work camp will not result in the same level of post-prison harm, and we make no
claims regarding the effects of those types and durations of incarceration.
81 See Western, Punishment and Inequality in America at 116 (cited in note 73) (showing
that men who had been incarcerated received lower wages, were employed for fewer weeks,
earned less than before they were incarcerated, and earned less than men who were never incarcerated); Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling, and David F. Weiman, The Labor Market Consequences
of Incarceration, 47 Crime & Delinquency 410, 412 (2001) (reviewing research suggesting negative
effects of prison time on earnings and discussing causal mechanisms, such as stigmatization and
erosion of human and social capital). See also Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding
Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration 32–35 (Chicago 2007) (describing how prison functions as a
“negative credential” to prospective employers). But see Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length,
75
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of job skills, and disqualification from stable government and union jobs.
Accordingly, former prisoners experience lower wages, slower wage
growth, and, importantly, greater unemployment. According to Bruce
Western, the average annual number of weeks ex-inmates worked
83
dropped from thirty-five before imprisonment to twenty-three after,
84
and they tended to have much shorter job tenure. Additionally, imprisonment was related to poor employment continuity for many
years after release. After release, offenders are typically shunted into
secondary labor markets with little job security, little opportunity for
85
advancement, and miniscule earnings.
Recent research also reveals that ex-inmates are more likely to
experience substantial disruptions in their postincarceration family
86
and social lives. Being in prison makes communication with family
and friends difficult and cohabitation with spouses and children chal87
lenging. Moreover, imprisonment likely hinders community integra88
tion, trust, and intimacy. Accordingly, men who have spent time in
Employment, and Earnings, 96 Am Econ Rev 863, 864 (2006) (finding “no substantial evidence
of a negative effect of incarceration length on employment or earnings”).
82 See Western, Kling, and Weiman, 47 Crime & Delinquency at 412–14 (cited in note 81):
[I]ncarceration can interrupt young men’s transition to stable career employment. The inaccessibility of career jobs to ex-inmates can be explained in several ways. The stigma of incarceration makes ex-inmates unattractive for entry-level or union jobs that may require high levels
of trust. In addition, civil disabilities limit ex-felons’ access to career employment in skilled
trades or the public sector. Ex-offenders are then relegated to spot markets with little prospect
for earnings growth.
(citations omitted).
83 Western, Punishment and Inequality in America at 116 (cited in note 73) (noting, however, that for those never incarcerated the average number of weeks worked was forty-three).
84 Id at 123 (finding that the effect of incarceration on job tenure was not statistically
significant for white men but was statistically significant for black and Hispanic men).
85 See id at 121 (differentiating between the primary labor market of well-paid career jobs
and the secondary labor market of low-income unsteady jobs, and explaining that “[m]any exoffenders are . . . restricted to the secondary sector, where employment is precarious and wages
are stagnant”). Western compared hypothetical workers differing only regarding past imprisonment and found that a “thirty-year-old black high school dropout, for example, earns on average
nearly $9,000 annually, with incarceration resulting in a reduction of about $3,300. The parallel
white earnings average $14,400, and the reduction about $5,200.” Id at 120. He continues, “Without incarceration, 4 percent of young blacks—one-fifth of all poor blacks—would be lifted out of
poverty, and the poverty rate would fall to 14.5 percent.” Id at 127.
86 See id at 146–47 (finding that among white men, separation was more than twice as
likely after incarceration); Lopoo and Western, 67 J Marriage & Fam at 721 (cited in note 73)
(finding that “incarceration during marriage significantly increases the risk of divorce or separation”); Beth M. Huebner, The Effect of Incarceration on Marriage and Work over the Life Course,
22 Just Q 281, 296 (2005) (concluding based on multiple models that “incarceration reduced the
odds of marrying and attaining full-time employment by at least one third”).
87 See Schnittker and John, 48 J Health & Soc Behav at 117 (cited in note 71) (noting that
the “prison environment may foster psychological orientations that prevent integration and
intimacy, including suspicion and aggression”).
88 Id.
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prison are less likely to get married than similar men who have not,
and they are more than twice as likely to get divorced than their nev89
er-incarcerated peers.
As bad as these health, employment, and social consequences of
imprisonment seem, there might be little reason to be concerned about
them in light of human beings’ uncanny ability to adapt hedonically. But
as mentioned above, certain experiences appear to cause severe and
long-lasting diminutions in well-being and resist adaptation. The hedonic
effects of imprisonment—chronic and deteriorating illness, unemployment, and the loss of family and social ties—are all significant, and all
have been found to be particularly resistant to adaptation.
The health problems that imprisonment exposes inmates to, including chronic headaches, hepatitis C infections, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis, significantly and consistently diminish self-reported quality
90
of life in sufferers, even with treatment. Studies have found that people
who become unemployed end up with lower baseline levels of happi91
ness, and these decreases last even after they find new jobs. Additionally, longer terms of unemployment result in more intense well-being
92
penalties. And although economic losses above the poverty line generally do not cause significant changes in well-being, many ex-inmates
are likely to find themselves in the lowest part of the income curve
93
where wage differences do matter.

89 See Western, Punishment and Inequality in America at 146–48 (cited in note 73) (finding an
increased likelihood of divorce for white men, though only a negligible difference for black men).
90 See notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
91 See Andrew E. Clark, et al, Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline
Hypothesis, 118 Econ J F222, F231 (2008) (noting that it is “well-known” that unemployment has
a “large and significant” correlation with subjective well-being); Richard E. Lucas, Adaptation
and the Set-point Model of Subjective Well-being: Does Happiness Change after Major Life
Events?, 16 Current Directions Psych Sci 75, 77 (2007) (reporting that individuals who “experience unemployment . . . [experience] permanent changes in life satisfaction”); Michael Argyle,
Causes and Correlates of Happiness, in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, eds, Well-being at 353,
362–63 (cited in note 5) (describing how unemployment decreases well-being even after controlling for the effects of reduced income). Lucas, et al, write,

The experience of unemployment did, on average, alter people’s set-point levels of life satisfaction. People were less satisfied in the years following unemployment than they were
before unemployment, and this decline occurred even though individuals eventually regained employment. Furthermore, the changes from baseline were very stable from the
reaction period to the adaptation period—individuals who experienced a large drop in satisfaction during unemployment were very likely to be far from baseline many years after
becoming reemployed.
Lucas, et al, 15 Psych Sci at 11 (cited in note 39). Or as Clark, et al, put it, “[U]nemployment
starts off bad and pretty much stays bad.” Clark, et al, 118 Econ J at F231.
92 See Lucas, et al, 15 Psych Sci at 10 (cited in note 39). Psychologists have found that unemployment has a significant negative effect on well-being even after controlling for income. Id.
93 See Western, Punishment and Inequality in America at 127 (cited in note 73).
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The impact of imprisonment on ex-inmates’ family and social
lives could have especially severe consequences for well-being due to
its multiple effects. First, the increased incidence of divorce will have
direct effects on well-being, because adaptation to divorce is often
94
slow and incomplete. Additionally, strong social and family ties have
95
been shown to encourage adaptation, and the disruptions inflicted by
incarceration could be deleterious to a prisoner’s ability to adapt to
96
other negative events. Finally, a variety of learned behaviors that enable inmates to cope with the experience of incarceration—including
mistrust, blunted emotions, and lack of planning—are likely to prove
97
maladaptive “on the outside.”
We summarize these effects in schematic form in Figure 1.

94 See Richard E. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 Psych Sci 945, 948 (2005); David R. Johnson and Jian Wu, An
Empirical Test of Crisis, Social Selection, and Role Explanations of the Relationship between
Marital Disruption and Psychological Distress: A Pooled Time-series Analysis of Four-wave Panel
Data, 64 J Marriage & Fam 211, 218, 223 (2002) (finding evidence that the chronic stresses of
divorce reduce long-term psychological heath, which improves after divorced persons enter into
new relationships).
95 See, for example, Argyle, Causes and Correlates of Happiness at 363 (cited in note 91)
(noting that the negative “effects of unemployment are greater if there is little social support”).
96 Consider Frederick and Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation at 314–15 (cited in note 14)
(describing the difficulty of adapting to negative outcomes when social contacts give inadequate
or inappropriate support).
97 See Schnittker and John, 48 J Health & Soc Behav at 126–27 (cited in note 71):

For example, relinquishing initiative and relying on external constraints may be rewarded in
a prison setting, but these characteristics can be problematic in a home or workplace. By
the same token, vigilance, mistrust, and blunted emotions might help prisoners to cope with
an especially violent environment. These dispositions might also, however, elevate risk for
cardiovascular disease and other stress-related illnesses.
Stress is strongly correlated with diminished well-being and with increased risk of heart disease.
See Ed Diener and Robert Biswas-Diener, Happiness: Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological
Wealth 39–41 (Blackwell 2008) (“People who experience stressful situations, especially intense
ones, often have a difficult time adapting back to normal: that is, they continue to experience
physiological distress even after the stressful or traumatic event has happened.”). Consider also
Zamble and Porporino, 17 Crim Just & Behav at 68 (cited in note 59) (suggesting the use of
treatment programs to change behaviors adopted in prison and to teach coping skills).
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FIGURE 1
THE PRISONER’S WELL-BEING OVER TIME

As Figure 1 indicates, incarceration takes an immediate hedonic toll
on the prisoner. After a few months, however, these large initial effects on
reported happiness may decrease as the prisoner adapts. By the end of
the prison term, the prisoner is certainly not as well off as she was before being incarcerated, but her situation has likely improved markedly
from those first few months behind bars. The ex-inmate, no longer subject to many of the deprivations associated with being in prison, becomes happier still upon being released. But the lingering negative
effects of imprisonment prevent her from reaching the levels of wellbeing she enjoyed before her incarceration. Alone or in tandem, the
ongoing negative health, employment, and social effects of having
been imprisoned have severe consequences for lifelong happiness.
Of course, the unadaptable negative features of post-prison life
tend also to be negative features of prison life. Our point is that life in
prison is characterized not only by those problems but also by other
problems that do admit of adaptation, as Figure 1 indicates. We are thus
not downplaying how bad it is to be in prison or suggesting that life after prison is no better than life in prison. We are simply pointing out
that different time periods during a prison term are associated with different levels of negative experience felt by a criminal, and that the level
of negative experience (due to the imprisonment) that is felt after release from prison is nonzero and probably substantial.
If the modern research in hedonic psychology is correct, it has significant implications for the theory and practice of punishment. Our
criminal justice system tailors punishments to fit crimes by adjusting the
size of fines and the length of prison sentences. If those adjustments do
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not affect the magnitude of the negative experience of punishment in a
linear fashion, then we would need to adjust our approach to sentencing
in order to create the levels of imposed harm we intend. The next two
Parts elaborate these points.
II. ADAPTATION, FORECASTING ERRORS, AND ASYMMETRY IN
UTILITARIAN CALCULATIONS OF PUNISHMENT
In this Part, we apply the foregoing research on hedonic adaptation to utilitarian theories of punishment. We find that adaptation to
imprisonment itself may enable deterrence at a lower utilitarian cost
than was previously assumed. At the same time, however, the hedonic
effects of incarceration on post-prison life may produce the opposite
effect. The social and economic dislocations caused by felony convictions may be imposing hedonically excessive punishments while simultaneously inhibiting efforts to appropriately deter both first-time offenders and recidivists.
A. Utilitarian Theory and the Linkage of Deterrence and Pain
The goal of utilitarianism, in the words of its founder, Jeremy Bentham, is “to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that
98
tends to subtract from that happiness.” In designing and analyzing
systems of criminal punishment, utilitarian theorists are thus primarily
concerned with achieving adequate and effective deterrence—of setting
punishment at a level sufficiently high to dissuade potential offenders
99
from committing crimes. Among utilitarians, the temptation to impose
98 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in The
Utilitarians 5, 162 (Dolphin 1961). See also id at 166 (discussing the costs of punishment).
99 See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in John Bowring, ed, 1 The Works of
Jeremy Bentham 365, 396 (William Tait 1843) (“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of that
pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be
the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it.”). See also Letter
from O.W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Dec 17, 1925), in Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed, 1 HolmesLaski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916–1935 806
(Harvard 1953):

If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don’t doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more
avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard
yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep its promises.
Utilitarians have focused in addition on two other related objectives: rehabilitation of criminals and incapacitation of dangerous persons in order to render them suitable to reenter society.
These goals of punishment have crept out of favor, however, as prisons have proven to be poor
vehicles for reforming offenders, see Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers
about Prison Reform, 36 Pub Interest 22, 25 (1974) (arguing that rehabilitative efforts have failed
to accomplish their goals), and incapacitation has had little noticeable effect on the rates of
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increasingly harsher penalties is strong. Criminal punishments generally
do not pose a threat of overdeterrence (unlike the civil tort context,
100
where the possibility of overdeterrence is a persistent problem). Because most crimes must be intentional, and because the majority of them
deviate so strongly from acceptable norms of conduct—robbery and
assault do not resemble socially permitted conduct, while negligent
driving at least bears a resemblance to safe driving—there is less fear
that some socially productive activity will be chilled through stiff penalties on crime.
Rather, from a utilitarian perspective, a significant check on the
101
degree of punishment is the cost associated with the punishment itself.
Part of that cost derives from the public expense of detecting, trying,
102
and imprisoning a criminal; and part of it relates to the opportunity
cost of removing individuals from the workforce and transferring them
103
to comparatively unproductive confinement. For present purposes,
however, the most important component of these costs is the pain inflicted upon the criminal. For a strict utilitarian, the criminal’s welfare
serious crimes, see John J. DiIulio, Jr, Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, Wall St J A14 (Mar 12,
1999) (reporting that as crime levels have declined, incarceration rates have still risen); Franklin
E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, Incapacitation: Penal Confinement and the Restraint of Crime
100–27 (Oxford 1995) (finding that increased incarceration rates in California led to a 15 percent
decrease in overall crime rates but did not influence the rates of violent crimes such as assaults,
robberies, and murders). Rehabilitation and incapacitation also have lost support as working
theories of punishment because they could offer no response to the critique that they seemed to
compel excessive and indefinite punishment of even minor crimes. See Herbert Morris, Persons
and Punishment, 52 The Monist 475, 485–86 (1968) (presenting the logical abnegation of proportionality in a system for dealing with offenders in which therapy, rather than punishment, is the
goal). We focus here upon deterrence, which remains the principal utilitarian goal of punishment.
See, for example, Model Penal Code (MPC) § 1.02(2) (ALI 1980) (stating that one of the general
purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders is “to prevent
the commission of offenses”). Nonetheless, we hasten to note that the theory we propound here
has little to say about rehabilitation and incapacitation, other than the fact that incapacitation
may be possible at lower hedonic cost if criminals adapt to imprisonment. See Part II.B.
100 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 167–71 (Aspen 7th ed 2007) (describing the theory of optimal tort damages). For an idea of the problems that might be generated
through overdeterrence, imagine the economic damage to society if the punishment for causing a
car accident were set at $1 million and people ceased driving.
101 See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 Stan L Rev 67, 68 (2005) (explaining that
most modern systems set punishment “not only [by reference to] traditional crime-control purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but also a concept known as parsimony—a preference for the least severe alternative that will achieve the purposes of the sentence”). A second and perhaps more important consideration is the need to achieve marginal
deterrence; we address this point in greater detail in Part II.C.
102 See generally Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates:
Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q J Econ 319 (1996) (analyzing the cost to
taxpayers of incarceration).
103 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Polit Econ
169, 193 (1968) (“[I]n the United States in 1965, about $1 billion was spent on ‘correction,’ and
this estimate excludes, of course, the value of the loss in offenders’ time.”).
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is part of the overall calculus: the utilitarian goal is to increase the
overall welfare of society, and the criminal, despite her deviance from
104
societal norms, remains a part of that society.
Accordingly, deterrence and social cost have typically been thought
to move in a type of proportionate lockstep. The greater the deterrent
effect desired, the greater the necessary punishment; but as punishment
(and consequently deterrence) increases, so too does the social price
paid to purchase that deterrence. Utilitarian legislators who draft sentencing codes and utilitarian judges who impose sentences are thus
forced to come to some sort of accommodation between the twin goals
of achieving deterrence and lessening the social price paid for punishment, and much of the struggle in setting appropriate levels of
105
punishment revolves around this difficult question of balancing.
Utilitarian theorists have heretofore assumed that the deterrent
“punch” of punishment was equal to the pain that punishment inflicted
upon an offender, and that, fundamentally, the deterrent effect could
106
not be uncoupled from its utilitarian cost. If a lawmaker or judge
wished to obtain additional deterrence power by increasing the punishment for some crime, she could not avoid the cost of imposing it
upon the criminals who broke the law regardless. The utilitarian pain
inflicted by punishment was, by this accounting, the necessary purchase price of deterrence. Yet new theories of hedonic adaptation cast
doubt upon this principle.

104 Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the
Problem of Crime Control, 94 Yale L J 315, 320 (1984); Margery Fry, Bentham and English Penal
Reform, in George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds, Jeremy Bentham and the Law 20,
28 (Stevens & Sons 1948) (“[T]he suffering of a punished criminal goes duly down on the debit
side, and must be balanced by some greater good in the credit column.”). See also Carl Emigholz, Note, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar–Drug Crime Sentencing Disparity:
Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 Rutgers L Rev 583, 599 (2006) (“In the utilitarian
calculus, the criminal justice system implicates a negative social cost: the crime . . . and pain inflicted upon the criminal as a result of the meted punishment.”); Levitt, 111 Q J Econ at 347
(cited in note 102) (acknowledging that typical studies may underestimate the costs of incarceration because of the unacknowledged “pain and suffering of prisoners and their families”); R.B.
Brandt, Conscience (Rule) Utilitarianism and the Criminal Law, 14 L & Phil 65, 73 (1995).
105 Compare MPC § 1.02(2)(a) (listing “to prevent the commission of offenses” as the first
purpose of the Code section governing punishment), with MPC § 1.02(2)(c) (stating that the
third purpose of the same section is “to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate
or arbitrary punishment”) (emphasis added). See, for example, 18 USC § 3553(a) (“The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”).
106 See, for example, Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation at 178–79 (cited in note
98) (setting forth the properties of apt punishment, including “equability” and “variability,” in
which the quantity of pain produced by a punishment can be adjusted to sufficiently outweigh
the profit of the offense).
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Deterrence, Cost, and Adaptation to Punishment

As we discussed in Part I, new evidence regarding hedonic adaptation gives rise to strong inferences that people will adapt over time to
criminal punishment, whether that punishment takes the form of a
monetary penalty or a prison sentence. That is to say, the convicted
criminal’s felt experience of punishment will likely diminish in severity
over time: both the prisoner and the recipient of a fine will be happier
one year after the punishment is imposed than one day after, even if the
prisoner remains behind bars and irrespective of whether the fined
107
criminal has recovered any of the lost funds.
This adaptation, and the forecasting errors that accompany it, sever
the linkage between the deterrent power of punishment and its cost.
Regardless of the duration of punishment, criminals will feel it less
harshly than they (or anyone else) expected. At the same time, they will
fail to anticipate their own adaptation, even if they are repeat offenders
108
who have been punished before. Indeed, criminals and the people who
sanction them—juries, judges, and legislators—will make the same ex
ante errors in failing to forecast adaptation. Deterrence is an ex ante
phenomenon—putative criminals decide which course of action to pursue based upon their expected outcomes. Consequently, criminals will
be deterred to the same extent that they would be in the absence of
adaptation. Punishment will serve its primary purpose, but at lower cost
than anyone had anticipated.
1.

Total pain.

From a utilitarian perspective, the harm inflicted upon the criminal
109
is a cost to be minimized wherever possible. To pursue this goal, a policymaker or judge must have some sense—within reasonable bounds—
of at least the relative harm that different sentences are likely to inflict.
One natural assumption in this regard is that the severity of a sentence

107

See Part I.B–C.
See Wilson and Gilbert, 14 Current Directions Psych Sci at 132 (cited in note 40) (explaining that people “do not recognize beforehand” the extent to which adaptation will occur);
Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson, 11 J Exp Psych: Applied at 121–22 (cited in note 41) (reporting
experimental results supporting the theory that “people often underappreciate their own powers
of adaptation”). See also Gilbert and Wilson, 317 Science at 1354 (cited in note 42); Ayton, Pott,
and Elwakili, 13 Thinking & Reasoning at 78 (cited in note 43) (studying people who repeatedly
failed a driving test “showed no improvement in their ability to forecast their moderate levels of
happiness” following failure).
109 See, for example, 18 USC § 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary.”); MPC § 1.02(2) (stating that one of the general purposes of the provisions
governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders is “to safeguard offenders against excessive,
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment”). See also note 104 and accompanying text.
108
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will scale approximately in proportion to its length or, in the case of a
110
fine, to its amount.
Adaptation uproots this assumption. As we described above, both
policymakers and criminals suffer from biases when predicting the intensity and the duration of the hedonic cost of punishment. They will
believe the effect on well-being to be worse than it truly is, even initially,
111
and they will anticipate that it will last longer than it does in fact. Thus,
punitive fines and time spent in prison will impose smaller cumulative
hedonic costs upon their recipients than expected because those costs
will ameliorate over time; spending two years in prison is not twice as
painful as spending one year.
As a consequence, policymakers’ forecasting errors (coupled with
prisoners’ adaptation) introduce a systematic bias into their estimations
of the effect of punishment. Punishment—whether by fine or by imprisonment—is simply not as painful as lawmakers, judges, and criminals
believe or predict. Any given punishment imposes less pain upon the
recipient and exacts a smaller utilitarian cost than previously believed.
For a utilitarian, this promises a meaningful improvement over the perceived status quo.
This is not to say that the criminal’s hedonic experience is the only
true measure of punishment. For instance, criminals may have duties or
responsibilities to loved ones that they are unable to fulfill while they
are behind bars. Of course, these deprivations will largely be reflected
in a prisoner’s hedonic self-reports: it will likely make a prisoner unhappy if she is unable to spend time with or support her spouse and
children. Nonetheless, we do not ignore the possibility that prison
might punish in ways that hedonic measures do not capture. We argue
only that the effect of imprisonment on a prisoner’s subjective well112
being is a substantial component of punishment, and thus that distortions in those hedonic effects have an impact on the overall quantity
of punishment administered.
2. Deterrence.
The usual corollary to this decreasing punishment would be a concomitant diminishment in its deterrent power—a negative repercussion
110

See Kolber, 109 Colum L Rev at 224–26 (cited in note 4).
Wilson and Gilbert, 14 Current Directions Psych Sci at 131 (cited in note 40) (explaining
the concept of “immune neglect” as a tendency “not to take [natural psychological defenses] into
account when predicting [one’s] future emotional reactions”).
112 Indeed, even the leading critics of utilitarianism value welfare and thus would count
diminutions of welfare as substantial harms. See, for example, Michael S. Moore, Torture and the
Balance of Evils, 23 Israel L Rev 280, 331–32 (1989) (defending a view that rejects strict consequentialism, but considers it as one moral principle among others).
111
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by nearly any accounting. But there exists an important asymmetry
between deterrence and the felt experience of punishment. A proper
accounting of punishment’s hedonic cost can be made only ex post—
after the punishment has already been administered. Hedonic adaptation will lessen the impact of that punishment over time, and so this ex
post accounting will necessarily include the ameliorating effects of
that adaptation.
Deterrence, on the other hand, is an ex ante phenomenon: the
important issue is what harm the prospective criminal believes she will
suffer if she is caught and punished, not the harm that she eventually
113
experiences. In the ex ante position, the criminal will not anticipate
her adaptation to punishment. Quite to the contrary; she will likely be
subject to a focusing illusion as to that punishment’s severity. Her expectation of the punishment will exceed what she will, in fact, expe114
rience. At the same time, the policymakers charged with meting out
punishments—juries, judges, and legislators—will be subject to the same
focusing illusions. They will similarly fail to anticipate the criminal’s
adaptation, and they will imagine a punishment to be harsher than it
actually is. Criminals and the people charged with punishing them may
differ in their evaluations of punishment on other grounds—criminals
115
may have higher discount rates than policymakers expect, or they may
116
have more information as to the conditions of confinement —but
113 Our account in this respect differs from that of Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley,
Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 Oxford J Legal Stud 173, 188–89
(2004). Robinson and Darley suggest in passing that adaptation to prison will inhibit deterrence, but
they do not account for the fact that putative criminals will evaluate whether to commit a crime
before they have been incarcerated, and thus before they learn that they will adapt. In addition,
even potential recidivists will forget about their own adaptation once they have been released;
without this learning, they will be subject to the full deterrence force of threatened punishment
each subsequent time they contemplate a crime. See also notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
114 See Gilbert and Wilson, 317 Science at 1352–53 (cited in note 42).
115 That is to say, by comparison to the general population, criminals may weigh the present
far more heavily than the future when deciding upon a course of action. See generally James Q.
Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (Simon & Schuster 1985) (presenting a theory of criminal behavior in which time discounting features prominently because the
rewards of crime and the costs of crime do not occur simultaneously). See also David S. Lee and
Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia *4, 28 (unpublished manuscript, July 2005),
online at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/research/pdf/crime_myopia.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2009)
(demonstrating that hyperbolic discounting is more common among criminals than the general
population); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1539–40 (1998) (explaining that hyperbolic discounting
will result in prisoners feeling more of an impact with respect to a shorter punishment than a
longer one); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q J Econ 443, 445–46
(1997) (defining hyperbolic discount functions as those characterized by a high discount rate
over short horizons and a low discount rate over long horizons).
116 See Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault’s Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 Utah L Rev 395, 470 n 346 (noting prisoners’ firsthand information regarding the conditions of confinement); Daniel M. Donovan, Jr, Note, Constitutionality of Regulations
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along the dimension of hedonic forecasting there is every reason to be117
lieve that they will behave similarly. Hedonic adaptation thus introduces not an interpersonal asymmetry, but an intertemporal one: criminals may experience punishment differently than they anticipated at an
earlier point in time, but different people forecasting the impact of punishment at the same moment will reach similar conclusions.
This felicitous asymmetry is threatened, however, by the prospect
that recidivist criminals might learn from their past experiences. Having once experienced punishment (and the attendant adaptation), the
criminal might understand that she will learn to accommodate the punishment she receives and that the initial shock of being thrown into
prison or fined a large amount will soon dissipate. Such information, in
the hands of repeat offenders, would diminish the deterrent power of
punishment, perhaps substantially. Yet remarkably this learning does
118
not take place, as we noted above. People, as a general rule, do not
119
remember their adaptive responses to negative stimuli. They report
their experiences to others as having been worse than they really
were, and they do not draw upon their experiences to make more accurate predictions on subsequent occasions. Because they do not
learn, they cannot disseminate any information about adaptation effects to the broader community, which remains similarly ignorant. The
consequence is that affective forecasting errors are remarkably consistent over time: having overestimated the harshness of prison once,
people are likely to do so again, and to a similar degree. The intertemporal asymmetry introduced by adaptation is resistant to even a particular individual’s life experience.
3. Adaptation effects in combination.
Viewed side-by-side, these two consequences of adaptation—that
people adapt but fail to anticipate their adaptation—have significant
ramifications for utilitarian theories of punishment. Adaptation severs
the linkage between deterrence and the pain inflicted upon a criminal:
Restricting Prisoner Correspondence with the Media, 56 Fordham L Rev 1151, 1166 (1988) (describing the informational value concerning prison conditions of prisoners’ letters from prison).
117 No study has yet observed any differences in how various groups of people experience
adaptation or forecast their future happiness. See, for example, Nick Sevdalis and Nigel Harvey,
Predicting Preferences: A Neglected Aspect of Shared Decision-making, 9 Health Expectations
245, 248 (2006) (finding no evidence that “doctors are better equipped than their patients to
judge the latter’s future ‘best interests’”). This is not to say that such differences cannot exist—
and these conclusions are certainly tentative, pending future research—but at the moment there
is no reason to believe that they do.
118 See Ayton, Pott, and Elwakili, 13 Thinking & Reasoning at 78 (cited in note 43). See also
notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
119 Gilbert, Meyers, and Wilson, 27 Personality & Soc Psych Bull at 1649 (cited in note 46).
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policymakers are able to achieve adequate deterrence at a lower societal cost than was believed possible. By not taking adaptation into
account, consequentialist calculations of the costs of punishment are
skewed upwards. A proper cost-benefit accounting of various forms
and methods of punishment—be they monetary fines or terms of imprisonment—must include the power of adaptation to lessen the burden of punishment as the criminal experiences it, while simultaneously
obscuring that anticipated advantage from the criminal both before
and after the fact. For the utilitarian punishment theorist, hedonic
120
adaptation appears to represent an essentially unalloyed good.
C.

The Post Hoc Effects of Confinement

Part II.A and Part II.B were concerned only with the effects of
adaptation upon a criminal’s actual reaction to a particular punishment
itself—for example, the criminal’s experience while in prison or in coping
with a punitive fine. With respect to imprisonment, however, the hedonic
impact of punishment does not conclude when the prisoner is released. A
convicted felon feels the lingering aftereffects of imprisonment in nearly
121
every area of her life, ranging from legal, to social, to economic. In many
cases, these ongoing ramifications of imprisonment are not easily adaptable. Consequently, prison holds the capacity to impose hedonic harms
beyond what a simple snapshot of life in prison would reveal.

120 It is worth noting that the state will also be able to incapacitate criminals at lower hedonic cost. To the extent that incapacitation is a normatively desirable penal objective or one of
the objects of the criminal system, adaptation represents a normative good in that respect as
well. See John J. DiIulio, Jr, Zero Prison Growth: Thoughts on the Morality of Effective Crime
Policy, 44 Am J Juris 67, 69 (1999) (cataloguing studies showing the benefits of incapacitation);
John J. DiIulio, Jr, Prisons Are a Bargain, by Any Measure, NY Times A17 (Jan 16, 1996)
(“[P]risons pay big dividends even if all they deliver is relief from the murder and mayhem that
incarcerated felons would be committing if free.”); MPC § 1.02(1) (stating that one of the general
purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses is “to subject to public control
persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes”).
121 A lengthy prison term—or, more accurately, the state of being a “convicted felon”—carries
with it a number of legal deficiencies that time does not cure. Federal law prohibits anyone who
has been convicted of a crime for which punishment can exceed one year from possessing a
firearm of any sort. See 18 USC § 922(g)(1). Twelve states currently prohibit some convicted
felons from voting even after they are no longer associated with the criminal justice system,
while an additional eighteen states prevent felons from voting if they have been released on
probation or parole, and five additional states prevent felons from voting if they have been released only on probation. See ProCon.org, State Felon Voting Laws (Sept 25, 2008), online at
http://felonvoting.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=286 (visited Sept 1, 2009). These
penalties are undoubtedly significant, but they are unlikely to cause substantial hedonic harm.
No study has shown any hedonic impact from the loss of a capacity as circumscribed as the right to
carry a gun or to vote, and it seems implausible that the loss of such rights would register hedonically on nearly the same magnitude as far more significant life events, such as births, deaths, illness, or
financial shocks.
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The social and economic effects of having served time in prison
can be extremely serious. As we outlined in Part I, prisoners often witness the breakups of their marriages and relationships while in prison
and have greater difficulty forming other relationships (including
122
friendships) upon their release. They experience greater rates of un123
employment. Ex-prisoners also suffer from more debilitating health
problems and far higher rates of incurable diseases than the general
124
population. And as we describe above, unlike the loss of money—or
125
even, to some degree, permanent physical injuries —these types of
afflictions have severe long-term hedonic effects and are very difficult
to adapt to. In particular, unemployment and the dissolution of social
ties are two of the most reliable predictors of long-term unhappiness
126
and anxiety. Measured against an individual’s happiness before being
caught and convicted, life after prison bears in some respects a greater
resemblance to life in prison than it does to life before prison.
The ramifications of this deterioration of post-prison life are twofold. First, it raises the possibility that consequentialist calculations of
the costs of punishment may again be biased—downward this time.
Any cost-benefit analysis of punishment that terminates when the
criminal is released from prison would understate the negative effects
127
that begin or endure after the prison term has finished. It is worth
noting that these negative effects do not accrue only to the former prisoner. Individual unemployment and social dislocation impose significant negative externalities upon the rest of society; the former prisoner
frequently must be supported by state aid, cannot adequately support
128
her family, and is more likely to commit further crimes.

122

See notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
See notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
124 See Massoglia, 49 J Health & Soc Behav at 57 (cited in note 73). See also Massoglia, 42 L &
Socy Rev at 295–96 (cited in note 73) (hypothesizing that the disparities in health between races
is due in part to the disproportionate imprisonment of different races).
125 See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 108 Colum L Rev at 1527–31 (cited in note 2).
126 See notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
127 See Levitt, 111 Q J Econ at 346–47 (cited in note 102) (cataloguing a variety of prior
studies that fail to incorporate the post hoc costs of imprisonment to the prisoner); Becker, 76 J
Polit Econ at 179–80 (cited in note 103) (limiting discussion of the costs of punishment to those
incurred while the punishment is ongoing).
128 Consider Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-offender Reentry, 45 BC L Rev 255, 260 (2004); Western, Punishment and Inequality in America at 119, 149–52
(cited in note 73) (finding strong effects of prison on unemployment and future life prospects,
including a 30 percent diminution in wages and an 11 percent decline in the probability of getting married for African-American men); Dermot Sullivan, Employee Violence, Negligent Hiring,
and Criminal Records Checks: New York’s Need to Reevaluate its Priorities to Promote Public
Safety, 72 St John’s L Rev 581, 596 (1998) (noting the connection between unemployment and
recidivism); John Irwin, The Felon viii (California 1987) (“Most ex-convicts live menial or derelict lives and many die early of alcoholism or drug use, or by suicide.”).
123
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Second, the harsh impact of imprisonment on post-prison life has
uncertain but possibly damaging consequences for efforts to set deterrence levels accurately. The initial problem, of course, is that prison
sentences exact a much greater toll than their term of years. The question, then, is which actors within the criminal justice system account
for this fact ex ante, when the question of deterrence is relevant. It is
hard to be certain about the minds of the legislators who draft sentencing codes, the judges who impose sentences, and especially the
potential criminals who contemplate committing illegal acts. Reliable
studies of this subject simply do not exist.
Nonetheless, there are indications that this phenomenon is understood but ignored. Federal and state laws have, at various moments, acknowledged the difficulties of reintegrating criminals into
129
130
society. However, these efforts have been scattered and limited, and
the public record is otherwise devoid of indications that politicians are
concerned about the lingering effects of prison upon convicted crimi131
nals. Moreover, no sentencing code directs judges to take account of
132
the post hoc effects of the punishments they are considering. Even if
judges wished to account for the post-prison costs of imprisonment,
they might simply be barred from doing so.
For potential offenders, the picture may not be quite so clear.
Criminals discount the future so strongly that some scholars believe
that even increasing prison terms beyond ten or twenty years provides
133
little additional deterrence. On the other hand, at least one study has
demonstrated that punitive measures that affect only life after prison—in this case, laws that force convicted sex offenders to notify local

129 See, for example, Thompson, 45 BC L Rev at 260 (cited in note 128); Second Chance Act
of 2007, Pub L No 110-199, 122 Stat 657, codified at 42 USC § 17501 et seq (encouraging “the
development and support of . . . comprehensive reentry services” for former prisoners).
130 For instance, the Second Chance Act provides only for limited grants to programs that provide technical training and drug treatment for felons while they are still imprisoned. Rates of postprison unemployment and drug use belie the notion that these grants are having a substantial effect.
131 The lone counterexample may be the treatment of juvenile offenders, who have the
opportunity to expunge convictions from their records in many states. See T. Markus Funk, A
Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining the Policy of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records,
29 Mich J L Reform 885, 887 n 9 (1996) (collecting state statutes allowing for expungement of
juvenile records). Of course, the simple fact that a criminal record has been expunged will by no
means ameliorate all of the negative aftereffects of prison, which are due as much to the social
separation imposed by prison as to the legal status of being a convicted felon. See notes 86–89
and accompanying text.
132 Consider 18 USC § 3553(a) (directing federal judges to consider a host of factors when
imposing a sentence, none of which relates to the prisoner’s post-correctional experience).
133 See generally, for example, Wilson and Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (cited in
note 115). See also note 141.
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134

residents when they are released from prison —have demonstrably
135
positive effects on deterrence. For at least one population of potential criminals, then, the post-prison effects of incarceration play a
meaningful role in ex ante decisionmaking.
This finding raises the implication that legislators and judges—
through their failure to consider the significant hedonic effects of
prison on post-prison life—have been systematically underestimating
the deterrent effect of prison sentences. Prospective criminals may be
figuring post hoc effects of imprisonment into the deterrent calculus,
whereas policymakers almost surely are not. Policymakers thus may
be overpunishing, failing to calibrate sentences accurately to achieve
necessary deterrence at the lowest possible hedonic cost.
Moreover, the straightforward problems with accuracy aside, the
manner in which the effects of punishment are actually felt complicates efforts to calibrate penalties to crimes. The difficulty arises from
the fact that much of the hedonic sanction involved in a prison term is
effectively front-loaded. The negative post-prison repercussions of
having served a prison term accrue to essentially any inmate: the differences in post-prison outcomes between offenders who were incarcerated for shorter terms and those incarcerated for longer terms are mi136
nimal. This implies that much of the pain associated with incarceration
is fixed—unchangeable once an offender has served at least a few years
137
behind bars. Consequently, for example, a two-year prison sentence is
138
much more than 50 percent as punitive as a four-year sentence. Tack-

134 These laws were inspired by a New Jersey statute known as “Megan’s Law” (after the
child victim who inspired its passage). NJ Rev Stat § 2C:7-1 et seq (West). There is now a federal
mandate requiring every state to pass similar legislation. See 42 USC § 14071(e)(2):

The State . . . shall release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section . . . . The release of information under this paragraph shall include the maintenance of an Internet site containing such
information that is available to the public.
135 J.J. Prescott and Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect
Criminal Behavior? *23–26 (University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No 08-006, Feb 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100663 (visited Sept 1, 2009) (finding that offender notification laws reduced first-time commissions of crimes).
136 Massoglia, 49 J Health & Soc Behav at 61 (cited in note 73); Schnittker and John, 48 J
Health & Soc Behav at 125 (cited in note 71). For the qualification that there may be aspects of
punishment that hedonic measures do not capture, see note 112 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the hedonic component of punishment is undeniably large, and perhaps dominant.
137 This effect is exacerbated by the fact that the first few months of imprisonment (before
adaptation begins) appear to be the worst. The initial harshness of life in prison represents a
fixed up-front punishment that accrues every time an offender is sentenced to more than a few
months behind bars. See note 111 and accompanying text.
138 This is true irrespective of criminals’ high discount rates. See note 115. Precipitous discounting
will cause criminals to view a four-year sentence as less than half as harsh as a two-year sentence; the
post-prison hedonic costs of incarceration will have a similar (and compounding) effect.
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ing additional years onto the end of a prison sentence will alter the
overall punitive calculation less than intuition would suggest, particularly because the same years that convicted criminals would have spent
outside of prison (but, with longer sentences, will now spend inside)
would likely have been unhappy ones.
This front-loading severely complicates efforts to achieve marginal deterrence against first-time offenders. A system of punishment
should impose heavier penalties for more serious crimes in order to
139
coerce criminals into committing less serious crimes. For instance, if
burglary, armed robbery, and murder were all punishable by life in
prison, potential burglars might elect to commit the more serious
crime of armed robbery instead, calculating that they have little to
lose; similarly, burglars who were in danger of being apprehended
might not hesitate to commit murder. If a significant proportion of the
hedonic punishment for a crime attaches after a single year in prison,
and if potential offenders take the post-prison ramifications of punishment into consideration when deciding whether to commit a crime (a
140
plausible assumption ), then the variation in deterrence among differ141
ent punishments begins to erode. As punishments begin to appear
uniform to the potential criminal, marginal deterrence is frustrated.
The hedonic impact of post-prison punishment will also interfere
with the deterrence of recidivists, though not because they possess any
capacity to learn from their experiences. Rather, felons who have been
convicted and imprisoned at least once already face severely diminished happiness outside of prison due to the social and economic
dislocations caused by their prior stints behind bars. When they contemplate whether to commit further crimes, they must weigh the hedonic consequences of prison against their devalued post-conviction lives,
139 See, for example, Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation at 169 (cited in note 98)
(outlining reasons to maintain proportionality between punishment and offenses); Eyal Zadir
and Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic
Analysis, 96 Cal L Rev 323, 379 n 211 (2008) (noting that economic theory requires marginal
deterrence—a lesser offense receives a lesser punishment—because otherwise a criminal will
have no incentive not to commit the most serious crime possible).
140 See note 135 and accompanying text.
141 That criminals have extremely high discount rates is now a commonplace. See note 115.
Economists, however, remain divided as to the theory behind this criminal behavior, and no fully
satisfying explanation has yet emerged. Our argument, if it is correct, suggests the possibility that
some behavior previously explained through high discount rates may in fact be attributable to
other causes. For example, offenders may be responding rationally to the front-loading of punishment in jail sentences, understanding that much of the hedonic cost of being imprisoned will
accrue whether they are forced to serve two years or ten. (This would, however, only apply to
first-time criminals; recidivists, having been imprisoned once, already will have been afflicted
with most of the negative effects of having served time.) This theory is, of course, highly contingent and highly tentative, but it raises questions about prior assumptions regarding the level of
information possessed by first-time offenders.
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not their happier pre-prison lives. If potential offenders have less to lose
by being sent to prison, then they will be more likely to select crime
over law-abiding behavior.
Of course, it is not news that convicted criminals face reduced
opportunities—particularly economic—after release from prison and
142
are more likely to opt for criminal activity as a result. To this welltread territory our analysis contributes three salient components. First,
these post-prison deprivations impose some of the most serious hedonic
injuries possible; few things are as debilitating to hedonic well-being as
143
unemployment and the breakup of social ties. Second, these hedonic
effects will persist; the conditions of being unemployed or deprived of
144
social ties are extremely difficult to adapt to. And third, these effects
145
are largely independent of the length of the prison sentence. The reduced opportunity costs that give rise to repeat offending are unlikely
to dissipate; more likely, they will remain throughout much of the remainder of the criminal’s life. Thus, while adaptation to punishment itself offers the promise of appropriate deterrence at a reduced price, the
post-prison cost of imprisonment threatens to reverse that same calculation, heightening pain while inhibiting its ability to deter.
* * *
For utilitarian theorists of punishment, hedonic adaptation offers a
mixed set of solutions and new problems. Adaptation loosens the link
between deterrence and harm, suggesting that policymakers will be able
to achieve adequate deterrence while inflicting less pain upon criminals.
At the same time, the devastating hedonic effects of incarceration upon
post-prison life may have the opposite result. Punishment may be more
severe than policymakers realize, and the ongoing nature of this punishment may skew both marginal deterrence (as applied to first-time
offenders) and overall deterrence (as applied to recidivists).
However, these forces will not counterbalance. For most criminals, the post-prison hedonic costs imposed by incarceration will likely
142 For a small sampling of this extensive literature (here applied to sex offenders), see generally Prescott and Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal
Behavior? (cited in note 135) (finding that reduced opportunities after conviction lead to greater
rates of recidivism); William Edwards and Christopher Hensley, Contextualizing Sex Offender
Management Legislation and Policy: Evaluating the Problem of Latent Consequences in Community Notification Laws, 45 Intl J Offender Therapy & Comp Criminol 83 (2001); Lois Presser and
Elaine Gunnison, Strange Bedfellows: Is Sex Offender Notification a Form of Community Justice?, 45 Crime & Delinquency 299 (1999); Robert A. Prentky, Community Notification and
Constructive Risk Reduction, 11 J Interpersonal Violence 295 (1996).
143 See notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
144 See notes 91–97 and accompanying text.
145 See note 79 and accompanying text.
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overwhelm the benefits of adaptation to prison simply because they
endure for much longer. Difficulties with deterrence introduced by
front-loaded punishment will only compound the problem. Lawmakers and judges must therefore find some means of circumventing the
distortions introduced by (1) hedonic adaptation to fines and incarceration, and (2) the extent and duration of post-prison harm.
III. RETRIBUTIVE AND MIXED THEORIES
Most scholars today do not deem punishment justified solely by
its capacity to increase overall welfare. Instead, they focus at least in part
146
on the idea that a criminal deserves to be punished. This retributive
principle is for some the entire justification of punishment and for others
147
a supplement to or a limitation on the pursuit of utilitarian objectives.
The retributive approach is, we contend, linked inextricably with punishment’s nature as a negative experience. If the state responded to
crimes by giving money or praise to the perpetrators, that could hardly be
called punishment because it would not be imposing something negative.
Even if such rewards were labeled “punishment,” they would seem incompatible with retributivism: to say that a criminal deserves punishment
means that she deserves something negative, not positive or neutral.
A retributivist could try to disconnect punishment from criminals’
actual experience of it by focusing only on objective facts such as the
148
amount of liberty deprived. But the reason that liberty deprivation constitutes punishment, and the reason that it is something that could be
retributively deserved by a criminal, is that it is a negative experience. If it
were not a negative experience, then it would not be retributively appropriate or meaningful and indeed would not be punishment at all.
The retributivist might reply that it matters only that liberty deprivation is generally negative for people, and that it is retributively irrelevant
if such deprivation is not negative for a specific criminal or if certain time
periods within a deprivation period are experienced less negatively than
others. But the reason that the state tailors punishments to crimes by
adjusting the length of a prison term or the amount of a fine is that
greater fines and periods of incarceration are taken to impose higher
levels of negative experience than the levels imposed by smaller fines
and shorter imprisonments.

146 See Leon Pearl, A Case against the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment: A Response to Professor Pugsley, 11 Hofstra L Rev 273, 274 (1982).
147 See Frase, 58 Stan L Rev at 73 (cited in note 101) (discussing the theory of pure retribution and its purposes).
148 See Kolber, 109 Colum L Rev at 203 (cited in note 4).
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Adam Kolber has argued that the actual experience of negativity
149
is central to punishment theory, and we credit his position. According to Kolber, different individuals’ experiences of punishment must
be taken into account. His arguments to that end support our conten150
tions as well, and we refer readers to those arguments. But even if a
retributivist were to reject Kolber’s claims by saying that the only relevant consideration is the way that a typical person would experience
punishment, hedonic adaptation would still be relevant because it affects that typical experience.
We thus believe that for a retributivist, it is of core importance to
understand the actual amount of harm that punishment inflicts. The
retributive theory supplanted utilitarianism principally by emphasizing that it is unacceptable to punish the innocent or to punish excessive151
ly the guilty, even if doing so would increase utility. A cornerstone of
retributivism is thus that the state may impose suffering only on those
who deserve it (criminal offenders) and only in an amount that they
deserve (proportional to the severity of their wrongdoing). For many
retributivists, imposing deserved punishment is not only permissible
152
but also required. Imposing too much punishment for a minor crime
is retributively unacceptable, as is imposing too little punishment for a
major crime. It would be wrong, on the retributivist account, to allow a
murderer to go unpunished or to give her an insufficiently severe punishment (such as a small fine). And because punishment is linked inextricably with negative experience, retribution can be implemented
only via a spectrum of punishments that impose varying degrees of negative experience. The level of negativity must be adjusted to accord with
153
the offender’s desert.
If a criminal justice system offers only the blunt choice between a
small imposition of harm (a fine) and a large imposition of harm (a
prison term), then it denies the state the capacity to tailor punish-

149

Id at 196.
Id. With respect to retributivism specifically, see id at 199–216.
151 For a discussion of the retributivist movement among criminal law thinkers, see Pearl, 11
Hofstra L Rev at 274 (cited in note 146) (“Within the last twenty-five years a number of philosophers and legal scholars have revived retributivism as a theoretical basis for criminal punishment.”). See also Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va L
Rev 677, 739–41 (2005) (arguing that because utilitarianism focuses on overall societal wellbeing, it may fail to assign punishments according to comparative desert).
152 See Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 104 (Clarendon 1997) (explaining that under retributivism, the fact that punishment is deserved gives us not
only sufficient right to punish the guilty, but also an obligation to achieve such retributive justice).
153 See Kolber, 109 Colum L Rev at 224–25 (cited in note 4); id at 226 (arguing that fines
should be a function of the offender’s income or ability to pay).
150
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154

ments to fit crimes. This thwarts the system from fulfilling the demands of retribution. Moreover, if increasing the amount of a fine or
the length of a prison term does not increase the harm imposed on an
offender to the degree expected, then any quantum of punishment
carries less retributive force than has been supposed. Adaptation dulls
the punitive effect of fines and incarceration, thereby changing the calculus by which a retributive theory must assign amounts of punishment.
If x amount of harm is deserved, will a fine of n dollars be sufficient to
impose that harm? The answer must take into account the (large) effect
of adaptation and accordingly reduce the level of harm equated with
the fine. This Part considers several leading theories from the retributive family and evaluates the extent to which those theories are affected
by the behavioral insights about punishment detailed in Part I.
A. Pure Retributivism
155

Although utilitarianism was preeminent in both political philosophy and punishment theory for most of the twentieth century, it has
been displaced in both arenas in the past few decades. In political
theory, the change can be traced primarily to the publication of John
156
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. In punishment theory, there were sever157
al leading contributors. But the individual most closely identified
with the rise of retributivism as the leading theory of punishment is
158
Michael Moore, and his pure version of the theory is most representative of the broad trend toward this nonconsequentialist method

154 We again note the caveat that hedonic reports may not capture every aspect in which
prison punishes. See note 112 and accompanying text. The analysis that follows does not apply to
nonhedonic punishment that scales linearly with the amount of time in prison, such as perhaps
the inability of a prisoner to spend time with her spouse or family. At the same time, we suspect
that nearly all of the effects of punishment will be reflected in the hedonic calculus. Accordingly,
perturbations in the hedonic impact of imprisonment will have significant consequences for the
overall level of punishment imposed.
155 See Lee, 91 Va L Rev at 737–38 (cited in note 151) (“The purpose of punishment, under
[the utilitarian] view, is not to give each criminal what he or she deserves, but to deter future
crimes, to incapacitate criminals by keeping them ‘off the streets,’ or to rehabilitate criminals so
they [ ] become better citizens.”); Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the
Victim’s Desire for Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 Wayne L Rev 1115, 1162
(2004) (“Utilitarians are forward looking; they countenance punishment only if a social good will
come from it.”); Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 Utah L Rev 205, 209 (“Whatever goal is espoused, utilitarian-based punishment is always forward-looking, seeking to reduce the intensity and gravity of crime in society. In
other words, utilitarianism takes the position that ‘bygones are bygones’ and that future consequences should be the sole guide for sanctioning decisions.”) (citation omitted).
156 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap 1971).
157 For perhaps the most influential early effort, see generally Herbert Morris, 52 The Monist 475 (cited in note 99).
158 See generally, for example, Moore, Placing Blame (cited in note 152).
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of reasoning. By applying the new psychological findings to this most
comprehensive and general form of retribution, we will have gone a
long way toward applying it to all forms of retribution.
Moore’s retributivism is not a mixed theory of punishment. His
definition of the word itself rules out any other value: “By ‘retributivist’
I refer to one who believes that the justification for punishing a criminal
159
is simply that the criminal deserves to be punished.” The project of a
retributivist is to illustrate that our intuitions and considered judgments about punishment are captured better by the idea that we punish due to moral desert than by the idea that we punish to achieve
160
aims such as deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.
The amount of punishment imposed must correspond to the offender’s desert: “[R]etributivists at some point have to answer the
‘how much’ and ‘what type’ questions for punishments of specific offences and they are committed to the principle that punishment
161
should be graded in proportion to desert.” In short, Moore’s pure
retributivist theory holds that offenders must be punished, that they
must be punished only because they deserve it, and that the amount of
162
punishment must correspond to their level of desert.
Because retributive punishment is inherently the imposition of
something negative, a necessary precondition to operationalizing the
retributive theory is an understanding of the manner and degree to
which fines and imprisonment actually negatively affect those who re163
ceive them. The findings discussed in Part I affect pure retributivism in
two ways. First, the workings of our adaptive capacities mute the differences between long and short prison sentences, at least to some degree.
And second, adaptation decreases the level of harm that an offender
sustains from virtually any fine or period of incarceration (that is, makes
that level lower than it would have been without adaptation).
The first point is simply that if “punishment should be graded in
proportion to desert,” then in order to deliver the deserved punishment, the state needs to be able to adjust the amount of imposed harm
to fit the severity of the crime. To do that, it relies on the mechanism
of increasing or decreasing the amount of a fine or the length of a stay
159

Id at 83.
See, for example, Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of
Guideline Sentencing, 38 Ariz St L J 561, 563 (2006).
161 Moore, Placing Blame at 88 (cited in note 152).
162 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,
39 UCLA L Rev 1659, 1663 (1992) (“[R]etributive justice is concerned with wrongful actions
from which such harms result. Although a punishment may sometimes involve the wrongdoer
compensating her victim in some way, the purpose of punishment is not to compensate the person for the harm suffered, but ‘to right the wrong.’”).
163 See Kolber, 109 Colum L Rev at 199–216 (cited in note 4).
160
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in prison. But as discussed above, such adjustments do not do well in
tracking adjustments in the amount of harm felt by the offender. Although an offender will expect a longer incarceration to decrease her
happiness far more severely than a shorter one, her expectation will
mistakenly ignore her own adaptive skills.
Even more so than utilitarianism and expressive theories of punishment, which place at least some importance on the severity that a
given punishment is perceived to have, pure retributivism concerns
itself with the actual severity of punishment. The distinctive feature of
pure retributivism is the principle that to punish criminal behavior is
164
inherently right. If it is not possible to punish the right amount, then
it is not possible for justice to be done. Pure retributivism thus requires a rethinking of the types of punishment that are currently employed. Those types create the illusion of a fine-grained spectrum of
available levels of severity while in fact offering a smaller and more
blunt set of options. A monetary fine, however large, may well constitute only a small diminution of an offender’s happiness. And an incarceration, however brief, will cause a large diminution of such happiness.
Adaptation to economic losses suggests that even substantial
fines may not change much the well-being of those on whom they are
165
imposed. And because people are able to adapt to certain aspects of
incarceration, staying in prison longer does not decrease happiness as
much as one would expect. This is all the more true because any prison term dramatically decreases happiness after prison. Thus, getting
out of prison earlier is less valuable than it would appear, both because prison itself is less bad than expected (due to adaptation) and
because the alternative of post-prison life is worse than expected.
Let us assume, purely for purposes of illustration, that a fine of
$100 is the deserved punishment for a certain instance of petty theft,
and that a prison term of five years is the deserved punishment for a
certain instance of assault with a deadly weapon. By “deserved punishment,” we mean that those sentences would impose the amount of
harm deemed morally appropriate in each case by the retributive
166
theory. How would the state deal with crimes whose severity falls in
164 See Moore, Placing Blame at 105 (cited in note 152) (noting “the commitment of retributivism . . . to the intrinsic goodness of punishing the guilty”). See also, for example, Sigler, 38
Ariz St L J at 563 (cited in note 160) (“[P]unishment of the deserving is intrinsically good; its
justification does not depend on any further positive consequences that punishment might be
expected to produce.”).
165 See Part I.B.
166 Again, some retributivists will resist the claim that their theory links punishment with the
imposition of harm (negative experience). But as we have argued, retributivism depends upon this
link. A standard retributivist position would be that someone who commits a more severe crime
typically deserves a longer prison sentence than someone who commits a less severe crime, That
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between those two? A larger fine will not impose much more harm
than the $100 fine (at least in cardinal terms), and a shorter prison
term will not impose much less harm than the five-year sentence, due
both to adaptation to prison and the negative post-prison effects of
167
incarceration. And how would a state respond to a crime far more
severe than the assault with a deadly weapon? No matter how long an
incarceration it hands down, that sentence might not differ sufficiently
from the five-year sentence (in terms of harm imposed) to reflect the
difference in deserved punishment.
This also relates to the second way in which adaptation is relevant to retribution. Whatever punishment is currently thought appropriate in response to a given crime will actually inflict less harm on the
offender than it would absent adaptation. When a theorist or policymaker seeks to connect a crime with an appropriate punishment, she
must incorporate adaptation into her assessment of how much harm the
punishment will cause. Just as would-be offenders will wrongly assume
that the initial harm of a fine or imprisonment will be sustained for a
long time, theorists and policymakers are vulnerable to making the
168
same incorrect assumption. If they do so, then they will set punishments that impose less harm than was deemed deserved—punishments
that do not satisfy the requirements of retribution.
This becomes even clearer when considering the way in which
Moore distinguishes his theory from the mixed theory of limiting retributivism, as discussed below. The mixed theory treats desert and utility as
necessary but not sufficient conditions for punishment. Moore argues
that we object to insufficient punishment regardless of utility, pointing to
169
our negative reaction when heinous crimes receive slaps on the wrist.
position makes sense only if longer prison sentences are considered worse experiences than shorter
ones. When a retributive theory addresses the severity of punishment, that severity is necessarily
measured in terms of the harm or negative experience imposed on the offender.
167 We note that retributivists often deem punishment to be only intentional, not merely
knowing, infliction of something negative upon a criminal. But, just as the criminal law almost
always holds offenders responsible for the consequences that the offenders knew would follow
their acts, the state is similarly responsible. See Kolber, 109 Colum L Rev at 197 (cited in note 4).
Moreover, whether or not the known but unintended consequences are characterized as “punishment,” it would seem irrational as a matter of policy, and perhaps indefensible on normative
grounds as well, for the state to choose to ignore what it knows will follow from its acts. The postrelease effects of imprisonment are at least known to juries, judges, and legislators, even if those
parties do not incorporate them into their own calculations.
168 For an analogous discussion in the medical context, consider Sevdalis and Harvey, 9
Health Expectations at 248 (cited in note 117) (finding no evidence that doctors possess better
abilities to forecast patients’ interests than patients themselves).
169 See Moore, Placing Blame at 98–99 (cited in note 152). This argument is the opposite of
limiting retributivism’s parsimony principle (the principle that we should punish no more than
needed to achieve the desired level of deterrence), because Moore maintains that we fail to
achieve the true goal of punishment if we punish too little. As discussed below, though, limiting
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Once again, we can translate Moore’s retributivism into penal
policy only if we understand how much harm a given punishment actually inflicts. The premise is that to punish someone too little—which,
as we have argued, means to inflict too light a harm—is a failure. If a
fine of $1,000 is thought to inflict a certain amount of harm, but it actually inflicts only half that harm due to hedonic adaptation, then we
170
have not achieved the retributivist objective. Absent an understanding of the effects of adaptation, there is the risk of systematic errors in
the calculus of punishment.
B.

Limiting Retributivism

Both retributivism and utilitarianism have a profound influence on
actual penal policy in the United States, and a prominent mixed theory
of punishment reflects that reality. In this theory known as “limiting
retributivism”—which has been “adopted by most state guidelines
171
systems” —retributive considerations set an upper and lower bound
172
on punishment, but within those bounds the sentence is determined
173
by utilitarian aims. After the bounds have been set by the offender’s
desert (measured principally by the severity of the crime), the specific
punishment is chosen “not only [by reference to] traditional crimecontrol purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation,
but also a concept known as parsimony—a preference for the least
174
severe alternative that will achieve the purposes of the sentence.”
Among other things, parsimony reflects the acknowledgment that pu175
nishment is expensive. If less punishment can achieve the desired

retributivism uses desert to set a lower bound of punishment and therefore is not entirely insensitive to the demands of the retributive theory.
170 As explained below, the consequences of adaptation for the parsimony principle are the
other side of the same coin: adaptation allows us to achieve the desired level of deterrence without inflicting as much harm.
171 Frase, 58 Stan L Rev at 68 (cited in note 101).
172 See Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law 179 (Chicago 1982):
[A] deserved punishment . . . does not mean the infliction on the criminal offender of a pain
precisely equivalent to that which he has inflicted on his victim; it means rather a not undeserved punishment which bears a proportional relationship in a hierarchy of punishments
to the harm for which the criminal has been convicted.
173 See Frase, 58 Stan L Rev at 68 (cited in note 101) (describing the principles used to finetune sentences, including deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and parsimony); Lawrence
Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 Emory L J 1059, 1062 & n 8 (1992); Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 58–84 (Chicago 1974) (describing parsimony, dangerousness, and
desert as guiding principles of imprisonment). See also John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 84
Ind L J 1129 (2009) (arguing that both retributive and utilitarian theories must be employed for
punishing past wrongdoing and protecting future victims, respectively).
174 Frase, 58 Stan L Rev at 68 (cited in note 101).
175 Id.
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end, then society gains monetarily by eschewing a more severe alternative (in particular, a longer prison sentence).
At first blush, it might seem that the effects of adaptation are
somewhat less problematic for limiting retributivism than for pure retributivism. The mixed theory does not, after all, require that each offender receive the precise amount of punishment that corresponds to
her level of moral desert. But adaptation is relevant to both parts of
the mixed theory (setting the bounds and fixing a specific punishment
within them) for the same reasons that it is relevant, in turn, to both
pure retributivism and pure utilitarianism.
When setting the lower and upper bounds of punishment, a limiting retributivist would (for the reasons we have explained) have to
look to the amount of harm that an offender deserves to experience.
The harm actually felt at each bound will be influenced by the considerations discussed in Part I: because offenders adapt to fines and imprisonment, they will experience less harm than would otherwise be
expected. This must be taken into account when deciding which punishments correspond to the deserved bounds of harm. It also must be
considered when deciding how best to fulfill utilitarian goals within
the prescribed bounds. As explained in Part II, any quantum of punishment may be expected (all else being equal) to deter more than its
actual harm would warrant because adaptation will diminish the actual harm without diminishing the expected harm.
If it were true that the available variations in degrees of punishment are overstated and that, to some extent, two primary levels of
176
punishment predominate (any fine or any imprisonment), then those
two levels could be seen as a very rough way of setting the lower and
upper bounds prescribed by limiting retributivism. But large problems
would still be present. First, would those bounds constitute the bounds
for every crime? The theory assumes that the lower and upper bounds
of acceptable harm will increase with the severity of the crime, but this
would not be feasible if only two main degrees of harm were available.
Second, it would not be possible to make the adjustments within the
bounds that are needed to fulfill utilitarian goals—a linchpin of the
theory. If there were only two punishments, small and large, then there
would be no way to carry out a theory predicated upon making adjustments between two bounds. Only the bounds themselves are available as options. This largely denudes the theory of its utilitarian element, leaving only the retributivist part remaining.

176 We acknowledge of course that longer prison sentences will still impose more harm than
shorter ones. We question only the degree of difference, not the existence of any difference.
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Adaptation does, however, make it easier for limiting retributivism to achieve one of its principal goals: parsimony. Because would-be
offenders will overlook their own abilities to adapt, less punishment is
needed to achieve the deterrent aim, thereby saving money and avoiding unnecessary (on this account) suffering. Just as adaptation affects
the analysis of utilitarian theories of punishment, it affects the analysis
of utilitarian elements within mixed theories.
C.

Expressive Theories

Throughout this Part, we have equated punishment with the infliction of harm on an offender. If that is what punishment means, then it
follows almost by definition that a theory of punishment must be sensitive to the connection between a sentence and the harm it actually inflicts. If the goal of a sentence is to inflict the desired (that is, deserved,
or optimal) amount of harm, then the state can craft appropriate sentences only if it understands the amount of harm they will generate.
Our position is that the standard retributivist account, discussed
above, makes sense only if punishment means the infliction of negative
experience (harm) on an offender. But understanding the connection
between punishment and harm might be less important for a theory
that can more plausibly deemphasize harm. Expressive theories of
punishment aim to do just that. As Dan Kahan wrote in one of the
leading early papers challenging the retributive/utilitarian dichotomy,
“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special
177
social convention that signifies moral condemnation.” On this view,
the important feature of punishment is its expression of societal dis178
approval of the criminal act. The harm inflicted on the offender is
not the focus, either for purposes of deterring crime or of meting out
that which is deserved.
An initial response that might be provoked by the expressive
theory is that the theory would presumably rely on harm at least as a
means of differentiating between the levels of disapproval expressed
in reaction to different crimes. If the purpose of punishment is to express disapproval, then how does the state express more disapproval
for murder than for shoplifting? The most natural answer is to punish
murder more severely, as defined by inflicting more harm on a murderer. This would suggest that the way in which punishment actually causes
177 Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 593 (cited in note 10). See also, for example, Dan M. Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv L Rev 413, 419–35 (1999) (favoring the expressive
theory of punishment over deterrence-based rationales).
178 See Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 Am J Intl L
747, 768 (2005) (arguing that under the expressive theory of punishment, the factors of the penal
system all “boil down to elaborate practices of praising and blaming”).
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harm would matter to expressive theories, even if its importance were
less direct than in the context of retributivism or utilitarianism.
But the story is not so simple. First, when the goal is to use punishment to express condemnation, what matters might be perceived harm
rather than actual harm. If policymakers, offenders, and the public alike
believe that greater fines and prison sentences will harm criminals more
than smaller ones, then the state has at its disposal a wide array of punishments with which to express the appropriate level of condemnation in each case. Even if offenders are actually harmed very differently from the way in which they are believed to be harmed, the level of
condemnation is unaffected because it depends upon perception rather
than reality. Second, and perhaps more importantly, an expressivist
might take the position that harm, perceived or actual, is irrelevant to
punishment because expression of disapproval need not be tied to harm.
If an individual views incarceration as a badge of honor, she is nonetheless punished by it because it still expresses the majority’s condemnation of her criminal act. If society could express disapproval convincingly without imposing harm, that would still constitute punishment.
We acknowledge that the behavioral insights about punishment
decline in importance as one focuses less on actual harm to an offender
and more on something else—either disapproval that is independent of
harm, or disapproval that depends on perceived rather than actual
harm. A thoroughgoing expressivist theory holding that punishment
involves only considerations of such disapproval would be unaffected
by the phenomena we have emphasized in this Article.
We believe, however, that few if any scholars endorse that immoderate version of expressivism. Someone who cares nothing about
actual harm would see no need to rule out torture, punishment of the
innocent, or punishments that inflict heavy suffering in response to
179
petty crimes. One can emphasize the importance or even the centrality of expressivism without denying that actual harm also matters. Indeed, actual harm typically correlates with the degree of expressed
disapproval, and perhaps not by coincidence: we express disapproval
principally by imposing harm, and more or less disapproval via more
or less harm. Even if disapproval and harm can be disentangled in
principle, they are closely linked in practice.

179 It would not be enough for an expressivist to deny the possibility of those outcomes on
the ground that they would violate the expressive purpose of punishment—for example, to say
that punishing an innocent would not happen in an expressivist system because it would send the
wrong message. First, sending the right message would depend solely on the public’s belief that the
accused was guilty, not on her actual guilt. And second, the wrong of inflicting harm on the innocent
or excessive harm on the guilty is not limited to the fact that it would send a bad message.
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So it seems likely that many expressivists would allow that harm
has relevance to punishment in a way that either links up with condemnation or else overlaps with it. Avoiding the imposition of excessive harm, and generally trying to impose more harm in response to
more severe crimes than in response to less severe crimes, would presumably be viewed as a positive feature of a penal system even by
those who endorse expressive theories of punishment.
An example that illustrates this compatibility is the clever mixed
theory advanced by Paul Robinson and John Darley in their article The
180
Utility of Desert. Robinson and Darley argue that punishment can best
achieve the aim of encouraging compliance with the law if it embodies
the community’s desert-based standards of justice. Although this theory
in name aims to achieve utility by creating a retributive system, it possesses a central hallmark of the expressive approach in that its goals
depend more on the perception of desert-based punishment than on its
reality. If people believe that community standards of retribution are
181
being fulfilled, then they will be more likely to comply with the law.
Robinson and Darley, however, do not emphasize the disconnect
between perception and reality but rather focus their attention in the
opposite direction. One of the most appealing aspects of their theory
is that it envisions the law earning its credibility by actually doing justice. The aim is to make people perceive the law as just by having it
182
actually be just. Among other things, “[t]he criminal law must earn a
reputation for [ ] punishing those who deserve it . . . and [ ] where punishment is deserved, imposing the amount of punishment deserved,
183
no more, no less.”
Imposing the deserved punishment, no more or less, requires an
array of punitive options that inflict varying degrees of harm to match
the varying degrees of desert. New understandings of adaptation indicate that those options are more restricted than is commonly believed.

180 See generally Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw U L
Rev 453 (1997).
181 Id at 497.
182 See id at 477:

[T]he criminal law can only hope to shape moral thinking . . . if it has earned a reputation as
an institution whose focus is morally condemnable conduct and is seen as giving reliable
statements of what is and is not truly condemnable. A criminal law that is seen as having a
different criterion for criminalization—such as criminalization whenever the greater penalties of criminal law can provide useful deterrents—is not likely to gain such a reputation.
183

Id (emphasis added).
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D. Other Approaches to Retribution
In a recent article, Paul Robinson catalogues several different
184
forms of retributive theory. In particular, he describes approaches to
retribution as falling into three categories: vengeful, deontological,
and empirical. The vengeful approach has its roots in the lex talionis—
an eye for an eye—and sets the amount of deserved punishment by
185
reference to the harm suffered by the victim. “The deontological
conception . . . focuses not on the harm of the offense but rather on
186
the blameworthiness of the offender.” Empirical retributivism also
emphasizes the offender’s blameworthiness but measures it different187
ly: whereas deontological retributivism uses philosophical principles
to arrive at the amount of deserved punishment, empirical retributivism uses behavioral studies to learn the community’s standards of
188
desert and blameworthiness.
All three forms of retributivism are challenged by the new findings about the effect of punishment on happiness. Vengeful retributivism demands that an offender “should suffer in the same degree as his
189
victim.” To make that happen, the state must assess the level of the
victim’s suffering and then choose a punishment that takes a similar toll
on the criminal. This requires factoring in the effect of adaptation on
the harm that punishment will cause (as well as its effect on the harm
190
the victim suffered).
Deontological and empirical retributivism aim to ensure simply
“that the offender is given that amount of punishment that puts him in
his proper ordinal rank among all cases of differing degrees of blame191
worthiness.” Although they determine blameworthiness (that is,
desert) differently, they both require that more punitive harm be imposed on more serious offenders. As in the case of vengeful desert, this
can be accomplished only by accounting for the effects of adaptation on
the actual harm created by punishment.

184 See generally Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 Camb L J 145 (2008).
185 Id at 147.
186 Id at 148. See also Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical
Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 Emory L J 557, 568 (2003) (“[P]unishment is justified based on some inherent moral quality of the act or actor himself.”).
187 Robinson, 67 Camb L J at 149 (cited in note 184).
188 Id.
189 Id at 147, quoting Edmund L. Pincoffs, Classical Retributivism, in Joel Feinberg and
Hyman Gross, eds, Philosophy of Law 541 (Belmont 2d ed 1980).
190 Consider Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 108 Colum L Rev at 1537–38 (cited in note 2)
(explaining that as a result of the long delays in civil litigation, harmed plaintiffs will be willing to
settle for lower amounts as they adapt to their injuries).
191 Robinson, 67 Camb L J at 151 (cited in note 184).
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One last retributive theory that merits mention is “consequential192
ist retributivism.” This is the idea that a state should “maximiz[e] the
193
total amount of desert-based punishment.” Police and prosecutors with
limited resources would aim to use those resources efficiently, punishing
as much as possible where warranted. The police would “focus[] on the
194
per-unit cost of deserved punishment,” pursuing offenders with the
195
highest ratio of desert to resources necessary for apprehension. Prosecutors would plea bargain extensively to conserve time, making it possible to punish as many offenders as much as possible, within the bounds of
196
the punishment they deserve.
This approach is an attempt to operationalize retributive theory,
and as such it relates particularly well to our project of identifying factors that determine the way in which theory can be put into practice. As
with all retributive theories, it limits punishment to that which is deserved. Imposing harm above that limit in response to any particular
crime would be out of bounds, and so the theory must be supplemented
with an account of the way in which punishment translates into harm.
Our contribution is to add one aspect of nuance to that account.
CONCLUSION
More serious crimes should receive greater punishment than less
serious crimes, but the human capacity to adapt complicates the pursuit of this core requirement of any criminal justice system. Neither a
large nor a small fine will much diminish an offender’s happiness, and
the amount of extra suffering inflicted by a long prison sentence rather
than a short one will be smaller than commonly believed. The state thus
cannot change, as easily as is assumed, the severity of a punishment by
adjusting the size of a fine or the length of an incarceration.
By decreasing the prospects for proportional punishment, adaptation restricts the penal system’s potential to achieve either utilitarian
or retributive goals. Instead of being able to tailor punishments precisely so as to increase utility or to reflect desert, the state wields a relatively blunt instrument that offers less rosy prospects of avoiding similar
punishments for dissimilar crimes.

192 For a discussion of consequentialist retributivism, see Michael T. Cahill, Retributive
Justice in the Real World, 85 Wash U L Rev 815, 833–35, 861–69 (2007) (explaining consequentialist retributivism as a belief that emphasizes aggregate levels of overall deserved punishment,
rather than focusing on punishing any given deserving individual).
193 Id at 833 (emphasis added).
194 Id at 851.
195 Here, desert is linked closely with the severity of the crime committed and the amount
of punishment deserved.
196 Cahill, 85 Wash U L Rev at 855 (cited in note 192).
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It might well be possible to find acceptable forms of punishment
that resist adaptation and enable proportionality in sentencing to be
achieved. But the task is not easy, nor the solution readily apparent. For
now, all we can offer is the unsettling evidence that current forms of
punishment do not impose harm in the ways or to the degrees that
they are assumed to do so.
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